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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1724



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MILITARY ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS ANALYZED

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 12 No 36, Aug 79 signed to press 27 Aug 79 pp 10-11

[Article by Prof Dr Stefan Doernberg: "International Detente and the Military Factor in Politics"]

[Text] Forty years ago World War II was loosed upon the world. At the cost of more than 50 million dead and monstrous devastation, this most terrible war in the history of mankind was a direct consequence of the expansive impetus inherent in imperialism. In view of the fundamental shifts in the international balance of power which occurred since and taking into account the history and results of World War II, various questions arise regarding the role to be assigned the military factor in contemporary politics--also the conclusions to be arrived at for the resolution of the currently most urgent problem, the security of peace. What are the prospects of this military factor? How can its operation be reconciled with the necessity for deflecting from mankind the danger of a thermonuclear disaster? Is it really necessary for the parallelism of detente with the quantitative and qualitative build-up of the military factor to continue the same as in the most recent past? Are any possibilities indicated for a radical change in the relations between the military factor and other factors of international life?

No contemporary problem ranks so high in international life, at all diplomatic conferences and congresses of non-governmental organizations, at bilateral and multilateral meetings of statesmen and representatives of the public; no contemporary problem calls so urgently for resolution and, at the same time, holds out so much promise as does the security of peace. Mankind has always longer for it, but up to the present century this longing has been condemned to remain a pipedream. Socialism was the first to raise the assurance of lasting peace to first place on the agenda of international politics. It is one of the greatest achievements recorded by real socialism in the long history of mankind that, ever since Lenin's decree on peace, the first legislative accomplishment of the young Soviet power, socialism has offered international relations a new alternative. By now all fundamental international documents, especially treaties between countries with differing

social systems, describe the security of peace as the most important goal. This very fact serves to demonstrate the power of attraction exercised by the humanist nature of socialism, the reality of its politics.

No Useful Tool of Politics in Our Time

Nobody can be unaware that, in consequence of the fundamental changes wrought since the end of World War II by the scientific-technological revolution in military-strategic matters also, war can no longer be regarded as a tool of politics or the continuation of politics by other means. That applies mainly to the category of a world war but also increasingly to regional wars, because the growing linkage of international politics here demonstrates its effects.

To an unprecedented extent we also see the emergence of a contradiction between economic interests which used often and in fact usually to underlie and stimulate military aims, and the foreseeable extent of the destruction of material values.

A thermonuclear war would certainly not be appropriate to wipe out the internal social contradictions of imperialism and, therefore, no suitable tool in this respect either for the politics of the ruling class, as sometimes used to be the case in the past (or at least was intended to be so).

Finally the general condemnation of war and its spread has become a factor--by internationally effective documents as well as, and especially, by the activism of the public--making very much harder the glorification and justification of warmongering.

Current international politics focus on detente. It has become an inevitable phenomenon of our time, the era of the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism, inaugurated by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Detente would have been unthinkable if the wolfish laws of capitalism or any other exploitative system had alone prevailed. It could achieve its firm place in international politics only thanks to the consistent and persistent efforts as well as the long-range peace politics of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community. Detente responds to the vital interests of all peoples, it represents the most favorable framework for international cooperation by countries with varying social orders; it alone provides the necessary conditions for undisturbed and promising development.

Concept of Force Condemned to Failure

The attitudes and actions of imperialist countries and the majority of their politicians, on the other hand, display a totally different interpretation of the military factor. It is assigned lasting if not growing importance. This emerges, for example, from all statements by NATO, from government declarations and relevant documents referring to strategic matters. One of

the doctrines championed in several variants claims that political detente and international cooperation would have to be linked for the foreseeable future with the further reinforcement of the military factor, the allegedly indispensable military deterrent of a potential enemy.

Of course we realize that there are decided differences of opinion in the ruling circles of the various countries as to the extent to which the military factor should be stabilized and expanded. Opinions also differ on the value and content of detente. Generally, though, the basic affirmation of the military factor in imperialist politics--and as a consequence the unrelenting pursuit of another round in the arms race, the increasingly proliferating material preparation of war--is based on the following considerations:

1. The military factor is to remain a tool of politics designed to pressure and blackmail other countries. But even the use of military force is contemplated, provided the conditions for such use appear favorable. That is why imperialist circles continue to strive for military superiority. This motive is rarely admitted, aggressive threats of war are no longer "in." That is one of the reasons why the development of constantly new systems and types of weapons of mass destruction (supposed to guarantee military superiority) is claimed to represent a preventive step designed allegedly even more to deter the socialist countries. That is a double fraud. For one the Soviet Union, as history shows, has always been compelled to stand fast against the imperialist arms race and to ensure its defensive strength. For the other the Soviet Union has set an example of steadfastness by constantly submitting proposals for an end to the arms race and for disarmament, all designed to halt the expansion of the military factor. That was the case already in the years between the two world wars. In the years after World War II this basic attitude was pursued in the proposals concerning a ban on nuclear weapons and the reduction of other arms, which the USSR submitted to the United Nations Assembly and other international bodies. By now there is a broad spectrum of initiatives and proposals by the countries of the socialist community, which in principle excludes none of the existing weapons systems and, even more, none of those still in the development stage or envisaged in the future.

2. The expansion of the military factor, especially the arms race, is intended to damage the socialist countries by compelling them to earmark greater resources for unproductive purposes. In view of the successes achieved in the building of developed socialism, the implementation of the economic and social programs decided upon by the party congresses in the field of science, education, culture and other spheres of social life, all of which increasingly demonstrate the superiority of socialism by comparison with capitalism, the attempt is made in the capitals of imperialism to shift competition between the two systems to other areas. No doubt the arms race has caused serious economic damage to the socialist countries. We are all aware how expensive modern weaponry is. Nobody is able with the same material, the same resources and, especially, the same manpower to construct military plant and equipment and at the same time build housing, schools and hospitals. That is another reason for the declared goal of socialism to achieve effective agreements concerning

the limitation and reduction of arms, because this will make feasible a redistribution of resources to allow for the improved satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the working people.

3. The accumulation of military power, linked with the far reaching militarization of social life, has an internal function in capitalism. It is designed to prop up the power mechanism of state monopolistic capitalism and, at the same time, conjure up the "above party" nature of the state--as an instrument unaffected by class and serving only the welfare and security of the people. Defense against terrorism, this phenomenon born in the lap of modern capitalism and encouraged and in part financed by the most reactionary forces, and which is currently assuming ever more threatening dimensions, is also quoted in justification of an internal and even social function of the military factor.

4. The arms race is a highly profitable business for the military-industrial complex; no other sector can boast such long-term secure profits as the arms industry. Thanks to government contracts the arms monopolies have no marketing anxieties. Weapons systems become obsolete and must be replaced, even if they are never used. The astronomic amounts swallowed by arms contracts show that this profitable production flourishes in peacetime also. As we all know capital does not question the purpose nor the serviceability of the output--as long as the dividends keep on rising. However, in order here also to pretend that class-confined and hidebound advantages are in fact benefiting the public weal, the legend is disseminated that arms production equals jobs and therefore serves social security. Another widespread legend claims that arms production stimulates science because discoveries and new developments in the civilian sector are byproducts of the development of new weapons types and systems. In fact the imperialist arms race absorbs resources and manpower, research capacities and, not least, creative intelligence, so that these resources are no longer available as necessary to resolve global problems of mankind such as the discovery of new energy sources, the assurance of adequate nutrition, health care, the defense of our environment, and so on. Not even the infirmities of the capitalist social system--unemployment, inflation, urban crisis and other social problems--can be defused thereby; on the contrary they are becoming more intractable.

Influential bourgeois circles, including realistic forces of monopoly capital, are beginning to realize that the expansion of the military factor will by no means benefit imperialism. Despite rearmament which was not even equalled in wartime, despite straining all efforts, imperialism was unable to prevent the approximate military equality of the two great politico-military alliances--NATO and the Warsaw Pact--, which has now lasted for more than 10 years. At the present level of armaments, the precision and power of the weapons which permit the multiple destruction of human civilization, nobody will be able in the foreseeable future to achieve that military superiority which might prove lasting as well as politically feasible. Imperialism failed 30 years ago in its attempt at nuclear blackmail of the Soviet Union; any politics of strength, the threat of force either today or tomorrow, is doomed

to even greater failure. History has taught us that it is also impossible to use the arms race to force socialism to its knees in economic terms, despite the tremendous material effects.

The internal function of militarism doubtlessly continues to be crucial for the capitalist exploiter class. Still, it cannot prevent either that the antagonistic contradictions of the capitalist systems are further exacerbated. A militaristic dictatorship is by no means the panacea against the revolt of the people. In the very recent past this has been proved once more by the anti-imperialist revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua.

All Types of Aggression To Be Outlawed

The socialist countries are steadily advocating that the military factor be further restricted, that it be gradually deprived of nourishment and that it may eventually be eliminated from the international scene. At their latest meeting in the Crimea last July, Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker therefore emphasized the necessity for not permitting any deadlock in the negotiations dealing with disarmament and military detente, but instead systematically to press for progress in this matter.

As yet the specific gravity and status of the military factor in international politics have not decisively declined. Only to a certain extent have we succeeded in braking its expansion and preventing the total loss of control. This goal is served especially by the significant conclusion of SALT II between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons as well as earlier agreements, such as the treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. That is a great deal indeed, because it stimulates a turn in the necessary direction of international development. But it is not enough. Currently the speed of the arms race still exceeds the advance of political detente. This is a contradiction we must at all costs remove.

The socialist countries have a clear program, taking into account the vital interests of all peoples. It includes internationally effective obligations regarding the use and expansion of the military factor, the strengthening of an atmosphere of political confidence between the countries. This is also precisely the goal of the suggestion for a worldwide treaty on renouncing the threat and use of force in international relations, especially the initiative for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the signatories of the Helsinki Final Acts, by which the nations disposing of nearly 90 percent of all means of destruction would obligate themselves not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons.

The socialist countries equally champion a ban on the further development and production by any country of any weapon of mass destruction. The constructive proposals on the lowering of the level of military confrontation in Central Europe, submitted at the Vienna negotiations by the Soviet Union, the GDR, the CSSR and the People's Republic of Poland, take into account the security

concerns of all those involved; their implementation offers little difficulty and is easily supervised, and they are therefore well suited to vitally strengthen peace at a most sensitive point.

At the same time it is obvious that the principle of reciprocity must be strictly observed in all agreements. Unilateral disarmament--that also we have learned from history--is just as ineffective as attempts to coerce concessions from the respective negotiating partner, which bestow one-sided advantages only. In the end all of these fail to create more confidence and therefore lessen security. As long as the arms race continues on the imperialist side or the imperialists block the approach to effective arms reduction, the socialist countries will be compelled to strengthen their all-round defensive capability. They will do this in the interest of international security while consistently and emphatically stressing the urgency and possibility of lessening military confrontation.

The coupling of measures to achieve the moral outlawing of any aggression, the reinforcement of mutual confidence and the lessening of material war preparations by the parallelism of diplomatic actions and the corroboration of public opinion represents the key to the achievement of the most necessary and long overdue breakthrough to military detente. On the agenda is a political decision against the military factor, which will be in tune with the realities of our century. It must be based on the unreserved acknowledgment of the principle of equal and undiminished security. In practical terms this means most of all gradually to lower the rate of military confrontation while maintaining the existing balance of power, equality in the military-strategic sphere. The political decision is necessary so that we may not be caught in the underbrush of technical and other details, because the issue of disarmament is certainly the most complex in the realm of international relations.

Just now, approaching the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, we must take heed of one of the most fundamental lessons taught us by history: Peace, freedom and progress are values achieved with so much effort and sacrifice that the determination of all realistic forces is necessary for their preservation. At the present time statesmanlike vision--in the leading circles of the NATO states also--must consist in refusing to bow to the military factor and instead support a genuine reappraisal of the interpretation of security. This effort will be well worth while, so that political detente may be complemented and made irreversible by military detente.

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CSO: 2300

'INTRIGUES' OF CATHOLIC CLERGY AT 1924 CONFERENCE RECALLED

Tirana MESUESI in Albanian 15 Aug 79 p 3

[Article by Beqir Sinani: "The Educational Conference of 1924"]

[Text] The Noli government, risen from the democratic and bourgeois revolution of June 1924, had also stipulated in its program the organization of the "educational branch on modern, national and practical bases." The teachers had been among the most resolute supporters of the revolution, and many among them had participated, weapons in hand, in the armed uprising. Therefore, they were expecting progressive changes in the field of education. The machine of the revolution, however, was passing through difficulties. Because of the interferences and intrigues of the Catholic clergy, the Ministry of Education was left without an effective leader and was not carrying out its functions.

Under these conditions, the progressive teachers mobilized themselves for the organization of an educational congress so that it would continue to implement the tasks of the two previous congresses (those of 1920 and 1922). Aleksander Xhuvani and Jani Minga, first separately and later together, took the initiative. On July 21 a declaration on the preliminary program was published, including the most important educational issues of the time to be discussed at the congress.

The congress was held in Tirana on 12 August; attending were 33 delegates, some of the best known teachers and educational personalities, who had come from all Albania. The educational congress, held immediately after that of the "Bashkimi" society, revived great hopes. Jani Minga, who opened the meeting, stressed in his speech, the historical importance of the event, and said, among other things: "Knowing that the teacher is capable of changing not only his own fate, but also that of the nation, we are convinced that in a new government with democratic principles we will lay the healthy foundation by building schools which will respond to these principles." In honor of Avni Rustemi, the great teacher of the national school, the "martyr" of Albanian democracy, a few minutes of silence were observed.

Despite the intrigues of the Catholic clergy, the congress successfully concluded its work. At the end, it approved a resolution containing its decisions. Its most important decision was that Albanian schools must rely "on national and democratic bases, that they must be all united in every place and in all points of view." In other words, schools had to be all united, for all children, without distinction of religion; they had to be lay schools without tutelage from the clergy; they had to be state schools and, consequently, there was no place for the private schools that belonged to the clergy. This decision, which was approved by accumulation, was opposed only by the two delegates of the Catholic clergy who, as a sign of protest, left the congress hall.

The leaders of the clergy, who wanted to preserve their private schools, with their religious spirit, rose up in anger against the congress decision, against the school "without God," as they considered the united school. The struggle was repeated in the press, as it happened after the Educational Congress of 1922. The clergymen demanded "the freedom of teaching" [meaning the freedom to maintain their private schools] through stale and absurd reasonings. Public opinion and the progressive and democratic press unmasked and severely condemned the divisive reactionary policy of the Catholic clergy, which opposed the interests of national union and brotherhood.

The issue of the training of teachers--another subject of discussion--was carefully examined by the congress which recommended the opening of a temporary teachers training school which had been planned since 1922.

The special merit of the congress was its interest in women's education. For this it requested a number of measures, such as the implementation of compulsory education for girls, the opening of a temporary teachers training school for the training of teachers, as well as a permanent teachers training school for girls, and "educational assistance for women's culture," such as anti-illiteracy courses, courses in crafts and so forth.

The Educational Congress of August 1924 fulfilled an old desire of the teachers by founding "The General League of Albanian Teachers" which, together with the "Lashkimi" organization, became a great democratizing force that began its activity in the education for adults with night schools in Vlore, Krume and so forth.

The congress gave opinions on other matters, too, such as compulsory school, granting of scholarships according to correct criteria, opening of schools, treatment of teachers and so forth.

Naturally, the implementation of the congress decisions was the concern of the Ministry of Education. However, the government and, especially, the Ministry of Education found themselves under the strong pressure of the Catholic clergy which was trying to maintain its domination over education and, even, to expand it, such as was the attempt to take over the state secondary school in Shkoder. In decisive matters the Ministry of Education

did not keep a consistent attitude toward the clergy; it made concessions to it. Thus, the congress decisions, although they were correct, were not considered mandatory for the Ministry and, in this way, the clergy maintained its schools.

In regard to other matters, however, the Ministry of Education marched on the path of the democratic program set by the government; the voice of the congress participants could not fail to be heard and to exercise its influence.

The Noli government could not completely detach the teaching of religion from schools; however, it restricted it into the classrooms, cut its teaching hours by half, excluded clergymen from teaching and cut their wages--a thing that had never happened before--and did not retreat in the face of the laments and threats coming from the fanatical circles of Muslim clergy.

The opening of the teachers training school for girls, which had been delayed for a year, was also resolved by the Noli government with the opening of such a school in Korce. Permanent courses were set up for the training of teachers. Other measures in the spirit of the decisions of the August Congress were taken and planned for the dissemination and modernization of education. But, with the overthrow of the Noli government, all these measures were trampled under foot by the obscurantist regime of Zogi. The noble desires of the patriotic and democratic teachers and the century-old aspirations of the people for knowledge and education were fulfilled only in the glorious era of the party.

9150

CSO: 2100

VIOLATION OF FIRE REGULATIONS DEPLORED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 29 Aug 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Stronger Preventive Measures Must Be Taken for Protecting Property From Fire"]

[Text] Along with the constant development and strengthening of socialist pr property, the party has assigned tasks and taken comprehensive measures for its protection from any kind of damage, and, also from fire. As a consequence, the results achieved are also great. Without analyzing the many examples and facts that speak about it, we must say that also in this field that work must be further extended by all relevant links and organs. This is because there are still attitudes of underestimation in the execution of the MKZ [fire protection] regulations and, in general, of technical safety.

In order to block the path to these attitudes and to prevent damage from fire, the major factor is the creation of the correct convictions and concepts that the protection from fire is the concern of all the people and not only of the MKZ units and volunteer groups. The dangers of fire are connected with the attitude of workers themselves in work and outside work. For this it is necessary to raise the anti-fire propaganda to a higher level in all its forms, beginning with the projects and places of work, because, on certain occasions it is insufficient or it does not exist at all. In this way, the working people will become more conscientious in implementing in every step the regulations, instructions and ordinances connected with the protection of socialist property from fire. Thus, they will struggle with greater strength against the lack of organization and discipline in regard to the strict implementation of technological processes, against underestimation and negligence and against other phenomena observed in enterprises and agricultural cooperatives. The further raising of the opinion of the masses is linked both with the intensification of the ideological work of the basic party organizations and of the mass organizations and the better organization of propaganda and the courses of instruction with regard to knowing the MKZ regulations and ordinances and technical safety in work. The positive experience of the Stalin textile plant and of other enterprises in this field must become an example everywhere.

As everywhere else, in the taking of preventive measures against fire, the strengthening of control is a necessary link. For this, as it is known, there are decisions, ordinances and recommendations of the Council of Ministers, as well as special regulations of the ministries and so forth. However, practice shows that they are not implemented everywhere and always; on the contrary, there are concessions and liberalism with regard to them. This fact explains many shortcomings and weaknesses which are observed. It is not allowable for any enterprise of the Ministry of Industry and Mines not to implement the norms and regulations that insure a normal work system for eliminating any source of fire. Not everywhere is there a requirement for reporting on the establishment of a strict scientific discipline over this. For example, the construction of a shed with combustible material inside the gallery of a mine, the use of electric cooking stoves for heating and the use of unprotected burning flames for lighting have been permitted. Violations and shortcomings in contradiction with regulations are also observed in special enterprises of the Ministry of Light Industry and the Food Industry, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Communications.

The agricultural sector has also been provided with recommendations, ordinances and instructions on the protection against fire. Thus, although the Ministry of Agriculture has formulated and dispatched special instructions on the protection against fire, these instructions are not being implemented properly and correctly. According to investigations, it appears that in some agricultural cooperatives these instructions are not known, or are known but are not implemented. In stables there are irregular electric installations; there are no fire escape doors, or they are opened from the inside; they allow unprotected flames inside stables, and so forth. More emphasized shortcomings of this nature are observed in Puke, Mat, Lezhe, Erseke and Diber districts. There are also problems in regard to the strengthening of protective measures in forests and grasslands, as well as, in the protection of agricultural production during the harvesting and threshing campaign.

All these things show the liberal and irresponsible attitudes, first of all, of the technical-engineering personnel and of the directors of enterprises and agricultural cooperatives with regard to the implementation of regulations and instructions concerning such an important problem, such as the protection of the socialist property. They also show the lack of control on the part of the sections of some executive committees of district people's councils, as well as of the responsible directorates in ministries. Towards these phenomena not only the control exerted by the enterprises themselves, but also the special control must be stronger and more strict. In some enterprises one can find good experience in the organization of weekly controls. Therefore, the generalization of this experience will block the path to tolerance in the implementation of regulations concerning the protection of property.

In our country not only the special MKZ units and organs, but also the necessary technical-material base are put in the service of protection against fire. The issue is that the opportunities created must be better utilized everywhere, since, on many occasions, there is a lack of necessary equipment for

requires that cooperation, analyses and control be strengthened by the state and specialized organs at the center and the base, according to the nature of the sector and the problems that arise. On the basis of this, studies and generalizations must be made and conclusions drawn for the future. These problems were recently discussed at a special aktiv, where the results achieved were analyzed and tasks were assigned so as to stimulate work in all directions and to keep our socialist property undamaged.

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FRENCH JOURNALIST GIVES EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF PRESENT-DAY CSSR

Political Opposition

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Aug 79 pp 1, 5

[Article by Manuel Lucbert]

[Text] Eleven years ago, on 21 August 1968, the tanks of five Warsaw Pact countries, headed by the USSR, invaded Czechoslovakia in order to end the experiment of "socialism with a humane face," too much contrary to Muscovite orthodoxy. Manuel Lucbert was on the spot to report on the present status of that country.

I. The Vast Extent of Indifference

Prague--The first surprise awaited us at the frontier. After 3 years of enormous difficulties and repeated refusals of a visa we were expecting a regulation police and customs examination before entering this "small corner of paradise" of the real socialism which Husak's Czechoslovakia wants to be. Amazing--in 20 minutes, during which 10 vehicles preceded us, the necessary formalities were quickly accomplished. The metal barrier was raised, the soldier on duty--a draftee, judging by his age--stood at attention, and ahead of us, at the first turn in the road, there already appeared the hill from atop which Bratislava Castle overhangs the Danube.

Before the war a sort of suburban train on Saturday nights brought crowds of Viennese here as neighbors, to sip a "gespritzt" (a quarter-liter of wine and a quarter-liter of sparkling water) in the open-air cafes along the banks of the river. Today Vienna and the former Austrian Pressburg, only 60 km apart, belong to two radically different worlds. The Soviet empire has replaced the Hapsburg empire. The small Saturday night train belongs in the category of nostalgic memories which unite the people of Central Europe across frontiers.

The second pleasant surprise awaited us in Prague, at the information center for foreign journalists. Upon our arrival at this very official organization, through which must pass all correspondents wishing to have access to government information sources, everything was ready. The appointments requested several weeks earlier had been arranged, the program set up, and the interpreter engaged, a situation so unusual in Eastern Europe that one must well wonder about its meaning. Obviously the Czechoslovak authorities for some time have been trying to show their guests, if not a smiling face, at least a courteous one.

The lasting presence of Soviet troops--although their deployment was supposed to be temporary--who came here 11 years ago to save the country from a make-believe counterrevolution, the relentless purge within the Communist Party carried out by the Husak regime against supporters of the "Prague spring" (500,000 expulsions), the organization of political trials despite promises to the contrary, a number of police improprieties in repression of the Charter 77, and a devastating political and cultural stagnation in the end give a bleak picture of Czechoslovakia to the outside world. One may well imagine that some responsible officials are desirous of changing the image.

A herculean undertaking, but not necessarily hopeless. The reality is rarely Manichean, especially in Prague, whose golden roofs scintillate in the sunlight of this glorious summer. But even the most beautiful city in the world cannot provide what it does not possess. For at least the fifth time in a single day we entered a bookstore, seeking a map of the city. The salesgirl gave us a disconsolate glance, which left no doubt of the nature of her response. "Curious, curious," we observed, "in the height of the tourist season." The salesgirl, amused by the bit of logic, excessively Cartesian in the county of Schweik, said, "Precisely because there are tourists we have received no maps." We interposed, "A fine example of planning." Not at all disconcerted, the young woman replied, "Among other things..." before directing her attention to another customer.

What is true in daily life is no less true in the sphere of politics. What can the regime of a few smiles and overtures, in truth still somewhat crisp, toward the outside world expect if in actuality nothing has changed, and if without being disturbed the same authoritarian--indeed arbitrary--methods of government are employed by a group which in 10 years has not succeeded in appreciably improving its contact with the people?

In spite of promises by party chief Husak at the 15th Communist Party Congress in 1976, the spirit of vengeance against the "oldsters" of 1968 is still dominant. And, as far as the defenders of civil rights who signed the Charter 77 are concerned, the authorities know hardly any methods other than harassment, police surveillance, denials of work permits, humiliation of all kinds, and imprisonment. Seven years after the first large wave of political trials, another operation of this nature, of wide scope, and for still more ridiculous reasons, is being prepared.

Some of those accused in the summer of 1972 had at least taken part in distribution in the streets, several months earlier, of tracts calling upon the people to boycott the elections for the federal assembly. With what, precisely, could the authorities charge these indicted in 1979, and prosecuted by reason of their activities within the Committee for Defense of Unjustly Persecuted Persons (VONS)? By informing the public specifically, more juridically than politically, of cases of arrest and sentencing of opponents, have they gone beyond their constitutional rights as citizens? Is repression less shameful because it has been revealed or because it exists? And if, in the leaders' opinion, it is justified, why indeed are they afraid to acknowledge it publicly, since, in any event, they do not restrain themselves from practicing it on the sly?

The Opposition Seeks a New Identity

These questions are less rhetorical than they appear. Around the fate of the 10 imprisoned members of VONS, held in Prague since the end of May, a political opposition, as in 1972, seems to have begun within the directing group. The partisans of unrelenting oppression, led by Bilak, believe that in the new, grand trial to be forthcoming, they will have the opportunity to break the backs, finally, of the critics. The more pragmatic elements see, in particular, the negative consequences that such application of short-sighted justice will have upon the country's image in the outside world at precisely the time they want to improve it. In their view, the principal danger of instability today is more at the economic level than the political. To them, under present circumstances, sentencing a man as popular and as well known to the whole country as the writer, Vaclav Havel, to a long term in prison would be a political mistake which would only add to the prevailing discontent.

Husak, as usual, navigates between the two groups by dragging his feet, or leaving them alone. In the final accounting will he choose the club or the rubber "gadget?" The rancor of his most intractable colleagues toward the opposition is all the more surprising since the latter, obviously seeking a new identity, is showing signs of being out of breath. The Charter 77 had provided to the various currents of thought which composed it a flag behind which they could combine with the illusion of unity. The police harassment, the repeated blows by the authorities, and the absence of any clear issue over the foreseeable term have ended in creating the discouraging feeling of perpetually beginning anew. A "chartiste" told us, "Our situation? It is as it was in the Resistance. But at least during the war one surmised that there would be an end one day, whereas today we do not see the end of our fight."

Under the impulse of younger elements, however, such as the communist, Jiri Dienstbier, and the Catholic, Vaclav Benda, both locked up since 29 May, not to mention the decisive actions of Jaroslav Sabata and Vaclav Havel, the opposition has experienced a resumption of activity during the last year. Contacts were made with responsible Polish officials of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR), and new clandestine

publications appearing in typewritten form were created, such as, for example, the magazine CIVEREC (The Square), whose motive force is Jiri Dienstbier, and HISTORICA, which provides the opportunity for proscribed historians to publish their recent work.

"I do not think, therefore I exist!"*

[words missing from text]... and leftists (socialist Trotskyite revolutionaries united around Petr Uhl, at present in prison). But these groups which, by themselves represent an enrichment of the opposition, are also the easiest targets for the authorities to combat.

Between these two unequal camps of political life, enclosed within the destructive logic of action and reaction, there doze the disillusioned and depoliticized masses, whose facade of unanimity is maintained only by the fear inspired by the various facets of the apparatus of repression. In a study devoted to "the Czechoslovak political mentality at the end of the 1970 decade," published under the by-line of E. Menert by the magazine, LISTY, organ of the Czechoslovak Socialist opposition (No 11, April-June 1979), one may read this conclusion: "For mass terror there has been substituted the widespread awareness of the fact that a citizen can at any time be subjected to any degree of the scale of repression, ranging from revoking bonuses for his job up to imprisonment.

Finding that such a system causes citizens to incur risks disproportionate to possible political activity, he noted, "Between the poles of fear and self-seeking 'careerism' there exists an incredibly vast area of indifference." He concludes, "Starting from there, how [to] attain, certainly not the pinnacle of the Marxist ideal of man, far from completely liberated in all aspects of his human condition, but only the normal human dignity of such modest heroes as those of Copek?"** The question overflows the confines of "normalized" Czechoslovakia.

* [The French caption "Je ne pense pas, donc je suis!" could be a play upon words as it means either "I do not think, therefore I exist" or "I do not think, therefore I follow" and is, of course, an obvious parody of the famous Cartesian principle: "Cogito, ergo sum." (I think, therefore I exist)].

** Karel Capek (1890-1938), famous Czechoslovakian writer, author notably of "Making of the Absolute" and "Universal Robots of Rossum" in which the robots (a word coined by Capek from the stem of the Slavic verb meaning "to work") revolt against their creator.

Economic Problems

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] In the first section of his article (LE MONDE, 21 August) Manuel Lucbert described the efforts of the Czechoslovak authorities in attempting to improve the external image of the country which is tarnished by police excesses and political and cultural stagnation. He also describes the gulf of indifference which is being created between the apathetic population masses and the activist minority, which are, however, fringe elements.

II. The Technocrats Face the Crisis

Prague--Several days ago, RUDE PRAVO, the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the reading of which is not the most entertaining of pastimes, startled even its least attentive readers: the paper considered it necessary to give the lie, on the front page, to rumors according to which the government was said to have decided to reestablish the 6-day week and to impose new price increases. Indignantly RUDE PRAVO thrust aside these "inventions of enemy propaganda."

Indeed, last 20 July, the mothers of Czechoslovak families had not been little surprised to learn of the elimination of subsidies for children's clothes, decided upon the very day that the price of gasoline increased by 50 percent. The social conquest which was the pride of the regime was wiped out with a stroke of the pen. The reason given: foreigners were taking advantage of the low prices and were exhausting the stocks. An argument which is greatly similar to that advanced several days later by the Romanian leader, Ceausescu, in making foreign travelers pay for gasoline in convertible currencies. For, in the east also, the crisis has the effect, among other consequences, of encouraging national self-interest.

After having for long pretended not to believe it, the responsible officials in Prague have finally become aware that the turbulence which is jolting the worldwide economy is lasting and will not spare the socialist countries. They even would have middle-rank officials tend to emphasize this line somewhat.

Thus, according to RUDE PRAVO, the Czechoslovak economy at present faces "the most difficult problems since the establishment of socialism." And, at the Planning Committee, those with whom we spoke enumerated, with commendable frankness, all the factors, external as well as internal, which threaten balanced development of the country: unfavorable evolution of worldwide price levels, tighter competition in the international marketplace, more costly exploitation of resources, increasing magnitude of investments required in the area of energy, limited manpower potential, and inadequate productivity and production quality.

Old Roadblocks

The internal roadblocks for the Czechoslovak economy do not date only from the present. More than 10 years ago the attempt made to eliminate them by reform elements within the party contributed to the birth of the "Prague spring" and its suffocation. The stagnation observed by the Husak leadership during the past decade has only caused the solution to the problems to be thrust aside. Now it is obvious that the current 5-year plan (1976-1980) will not be achieved. The objectives set for increases in the national product have not been attained in any of the last 3 years, and such will probably be the case for 1979, judging from the results of the first half: the growth in industrial production (+2.6 percent) is almost two points below predictions. The harvest will be mediocre, which will necessitate additional imports of fodder (about 2 million tons annually).

In the discussion, more or less open, depending upon the times, which has ceaselessly been going on for some years between economic and political officials, will the abrupt aggravation of the energy crisis be the decisive element to tip the balance in favor of partisans of controlled change? The intense struggle over the subject which is taking place within the party's leadership could in any case, depending upon events, have entered into a more acute phase.

Indications of such confrontations appeared in the open in December 1977 when several Czech managers openly criticized economic mismanagement. At the time that display of bad humor had been interpreted above all as the sign of the discontent of certain administrative personnel with the advantages which in their opinion were granted to Slovakia. But when, several months later, the minister of finance, Leopold Ler, protege of Strougal, the head of the government, offered the broad outlines of an "experiment"--the word "reform" is absolutely taboo--which was going to be launched in several pilot enterprises, it indeed had to be admitted that something was happening.

That experiment is certainly a prudent one. The precautions taken by Matejka--the secretary of the government commission responsible for effecting the experiment and observing its progress--in approaching the matter demonstrate that here was an advance into a delicate area. Straight off our informant told us, "Any remark insinuating that there is any similarity between our experiment and the reform of Ota Sik (before 1968) is incorrect." There we were forewarned. The task of the commission over which Ler presides and upon which sit 20 technocrats (directors of large enterprises and representatives of ministries and research institutes) is not, however, an insignificant one. It is a matter, Matejka told us, of testing new methods in order to improve the system of managing enterprises and modify the planning system. He added, "The solutions will be of decisive importance in transforming the structure of consumption and increasing the efficiency of the production apparatus and of foreign trade." In no way, he immediately added, is there any question of affecting the principles of the central plan; only better defining it is appropriate.

The idea of the "experimenters," let us remark, is said to be to make general, during the next 5-year plan (1981-1985) those measures which would have been proved. But, we were told, even if conditions exist for that to be true, "a final decision in the matter has not yet been made." Nor was it concealed from us that resistance is being manifested, particularly among enterprise directors upon whom will devolve the responsibility for putting the desired changes into operation.

Under these conditions the press campaign, unleashed in the middle of August, against managers who have the "bureaucratic approach" to problems and employ "outmoded work methods" may serve purposes other than simply seeking, by propaganda means, scapegoats for the present difficulties. Certainly the winter was difficult, certainly the energy shortages in January and February caused industry to lose more than 6 billion crowns (in the meantime more than 4 billion crowns are said to have been made up)--but RUDE PRAVO says, "the deficiencies in our economy are long-term ones"--and caused the Communist Party organ to ask urgently for the classic interplay of criticism and self-criticism, at the same time threatening, "We can no longer continue to put off the personnel changes which have become essential."

Penalties Difficult To Impose

However, the political obstacles are not only at the highest hierarchic levels. The concern for improved production quality compels officials to take steps which may directly affect the purchasing power of wage-earners. Thus, the new regulation which became effective on 1 January of the year provides that that defective products shall be deducted from the value of production adopted in calculation of salaries. Personal financial penalties, in addition, are provided for bad workers. Last, total production quantity is no longer regarded as the principal criterion of plan realization; it becomes, more modestly, simply an element of orientation.

In an article published in March by the magazine ZIVOT STRANY (Party Life), the same Leopold Ler does not hide the fact that such new legislation could give rise to "serious conflicts." And in fact, according to what we were told at the Planning Committee, it does indeed seem that there is hesitancy in making this measure general for workers. "For the time being," we were told, "the penalties are aimed especially at the administrative sector."

The workers may all the more acutely feel the squeeze upon their incomes since, in all logic, the pressure upon prices should become accentuated. Officially, up to last year, price increases of 1 percent annually were admitted. For the current year it will be difficult to stick to such a low figure. But do the officials have any choice while they are predicting, for the first time, overall "stabilization" of economic activity, and indeed stagnation for the non-industrial sectors (trade and services)?

Like its CEMA allies, no longer can Czechoslovakia escape the general tendency toward slower growth in developed countries. Its ideological rigor in no way shelters it from tensions. In its particular case the situation is aggravated by the fact that during a 10-year period much time has been lost. How to make up for it without running into a political crisis? Will not the price which today's technocrats are asking to be paid, in the final analysis, be higher than that which was demanded by the reformers during the "Prague spring?" The latter, at least, wanted to offer democracy as a bonus.

International Arena

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] After having described the internal evolution of Czechoslovak society, where a gulf of indifference has formed between the apathetic masses and an activist minority of defenders of human rights, as well as the effects of political roadblocks upon the economic situation (LE MONDE, 21-22 August), Manuel Lucbert examines this country's position in the international arena.

III. A Solid Link in the "Camp"

Prague--There are gestures which are not misleading. When, in the spring of last year, the world learned that the first foreign cosmonaut authorized by the Soviets to be on board one of their space vehicles was a Czechoslovak citizen, the conclusion was self-evident: 10 years after crushing the "Prague spring" the USSR was continuing to grant a prominent place within the Warsaw Pact, to its relations with Czechoslovakia, rescued in 1968 in extremes from the claws of "revisionism" and "counterrevolution." From East Berlin to Sofia, where there are also dreams of being recognized as the best pupil in the class, the choice must indeed have made many envious.

More recently, on the occasion of Kosygin's visit to Prague in the middle of May, the Soviets gave a new indication of the role they intend to be played by the Husak regime. Under terms of agreements executed by the head of the Soviet government and his colleague Strougal, Czechoslovakia in the next few years will become the principal supplier of reactors for the nuclear powerplants of the socialist countries. Between now and 1985 the Skoda plants at Pilsen, rebuilt in order to fulfill their new mission, are to deliver 19 reactors to members of CEMA, the organization for economic cooperation placed under the crook of Moscow.

History has sometimes seen surprising situation turnabouts. When, 20 years ago, Czech economists, to turn to account the country's rich uranium deposits (a 200-year reserve estimated), wanted to develop a strong nuclear industry for peaceful purposes they came up against a Soviet veto. The

Soviets argued that their petroleum resources for a long time would be sufficient to provide amply for the needs of their allies. Today it is difficult to get Moscow to increase its quotas for delivery of "black gold" to the CEMA countries. During the next 5-year plan (1981-1985) the sales of energy products by the USSR to its partners will grow by only 20 percent, whereas during the present 5-year plan a 54-percent increase is provided, and from 1971 to 1975 a doubling was observed.

Under the stress of necessity the USSR has been compelled to grant its ally in 1979 what it had not long ago refused. In the meantime, it is true, certain things have changed in Czechoslovakia. Only from Antonini Novotny, ousted from the Communist Party directorate in January 1968 by the reformers, had the Soviets ever succeeded in getting approval for stationing their troops in the country. The "international aid" brought by Moscow to its wavering ally in August 1968 in the form of 500,000 soldiers and an army of tanks ipse facto settled that matter. Today Czechoslovakia is more than ever--a fact that nobody will deny--"a solid link in the socialist community."

Within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA the Prague leaders plead, without any coaxing, the cause of "increased strengthening of unity and cohesiveness." Inside the communist movement they are the first to vilify the slightest heresy. In March 1977, Vasil Bilak, No 2 man of the regime, in a report to the Central Committee which was never published, accused the "Eurocommunist" parties of "treason." And last December the Communist Party organ, RUDE PRAVO, sustained that note, saying that "Eurocommunism is a parasite upon the body of the revolutionary movement." In no other capital within the "camp," except perhaps Sofia, would the utterance of such slashing opinions be ventured.

Some Embarrassment

Despite these indications of unconditional loyalty, however, 11 years after what Bilak calls the "alleged Soviet military intervention," there remains a certain embarrassment between Prague and Moscow. Each year 21 August continues to be commemorated in the press as a decisive defeat of the "counterrevolutionary" forces. But when Brezhnev came to the Czechoslovak capital last year he preferred to come in June rather than in August. It is because in spite of "normalization" the internal situation is far from being stabilized. To this day the present leaders have shown no gesture of forgiveness, nor any desire to integrate the men of 1968.

Now it is not certain that such a rigid policy has been formed in order to reassure the Soviets. The latter assuredly are not ready to grant Czechoslovakia, a country situated at the periphery of the "camp" and for that reason particularly exposed, the same liberties which they tolerate in Poland or Hungary. But, from the time their strategic interests are assured, and today such is the case, would they be completely opposed to relaxation of the pressure capable of fueling new disturbances?

Conversely, the present leadership in power at Prague, or at least certain groups within it, sometimes give the impression by their behavior of following the USSR's policy of detente not without reluctance. Here the Helsinki Conference is regarded as a "culminating point" and they do not seem unhappy at having since then again come down the grade from it by several layers of altitude. The arrest, in Prague, of 10 responsible officers of Charter 77, 15 days before the Carter-Brezhnev meeting in Vienna, was one of the most visible counterattacks intended to cut short, among the people, any feeling of euphoria in the face of what they might have considered a vigorous resumption of detente. In this respect the interests of the leaders in Prague and those in East Berlin are convergent. Both are so little assured of the people's support for their regimes that they both believe they must maintain police and ideological harassment in order to prevent the birth of vain illusions.

The interest displayed in Prague toward the idea of a European conference on disarmament in part reflects this kind of concern. Certainly, as in other eastern countries, Czechoslovakia feels the growing weight of military expenditures as a shackle upon its economic development. Strougal, the head of the government, had openly deplored it in his ministerial statement of April 1978.

Forgetting the Sequels to Helsinki

It is known that it will take years before this conference is held and that it will yield no results but it offers a number of advantages to Czechoslovak diplomacy. It can be used, when the opportunity arises, to divert attention from the sequels to the Helsinki conference (Madrid meeting planned for next year). At the same time, despite denials in this connection, it removes the military components from the cooperation process begun 4 years ago in the Finnish capital. Now it is clear that if the so-called humanitarian questions are to be at Madrid as they were at Belgrade in 1977, central to the discussions, the communist countries will do nothing to promote the success of this meeting. It is indeed significant that the Warsaw Pact countries are proposing that the disarmament conference be held at a policy level whereas they do not for the present think that necessary for the Madrid meeting.

The mixed feelings of Czechoslovak diplomacy faced with the dynamics of detente in large part explains the slowness with which they have occupied themselves, during the last decade, with "normalizing" relations with the Western countries. With the exception of Finland and West Germany, an important trading partner, Husak has not visited any Western countries since 1969. In general, moreover, he travels rather little.

The minister of foreign affairs, Chnoupek, proves to be distinctly more active, and certain guideposts he is establishing could, in an indefinite future, provide the outlines for more "personalized" diplomacy. Thus, he has gone to Spain this year for the first time since reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1977 and he is going on an unexpected tour of Asian

countries (Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines). Last year, and in the spring of 1979, he made conspicuous trips to the African Continent.

Upon a more regional level the chief Czechoslovak diplomat is taking particular pains to improve relations with neighboring Austria, perhaps in the hope that they may serve to change the image of Czechoslovakia in other Western countries. But that road is not free from traps, as the grotesque "misunderstandings" (whether intentional or not) which resulted in connection with the visit of Cardinal Tomasek to Salzburg in May. In order for the cardinal to obtain his exit visa--which was at first refused--it was necessary for the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Pahr, to make a vigorous protestation and on top of that, for President Kirchsclaeger, of Austria, to intervene firmly.

As for relations with France, they are gloomy, but a visit to Prague by Jean Francois-Poncet is planned for the end of the year. Upon the level of trade, among Western trading partners our country ranks in seventh place, far behind West Germany. For the future some increase, on the part of Czechoslovakia, is not ruled out, but no one believes there will be a spectacular spurt.

All the same, does the Husak regime wish to do anything at all that would strikingly signify, to public opinion in the West, a relaxation of the line followed for 10 years? Most of the members of the present leadership group are still too much haunted by the "great fear" of 1968 to chase after shadows all of a sudden. Here and there some attempts are being made, timidly, to get out of the rut. But though they be insufficient for piercing the opaque wall of the future, undoubtedly nothing says it better than the reply made in 1975 by the writer Jiri Hanzelka and his colleague Miroslav Zikmund to the journalist Jiri Lederer (imprisoned in 1977) when he asked them when, in their opinion, a book of theirs could normally appear in Czechoslovakia: "It would be easier for us to say when a Soviet or American rocket will fly to the planet Mars than to answer that question."*

* Jiri Lederer, "Tschechische gesprache (Conversations With 16 Czech Writers)," Rowohlt Verlag, 1979 Hanzelka and Zikmund are very popular authors by virtue of their accounts of voyages in various countries.

PREROV HIGH SCHOOL TESTING NEW EDUCATIONAL APPROACH

Praque RUDE PRAVO in Czech 4 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by PhDr Frantisek Sedlacek, director of the Prerov Gymnasium]

[Text] The realization of further development of the Czechoslovak educational system requires among other things permanent cooperation among schools of different types and industrial and agricultural plants as well as a well-planned application of the experiences of the experimental schools using new curricula.

I am happy to report good experiences of our North Moravian Kraj--and of Prerov Okres in particular--where, as a result of the attention paid by party, state and trade union organs and organizations, we were able to realize effective cooperation of gymnasiums, technical high schools and apprentice schools with industrial and agricultural plants in securing personnel and material prerequisites for teaching of polytechnic and technical subjects in schools.

This is a result of a systematic cooperation of teachers and economic managers who are aware that improved training and educational results of our schools contribute to the development of our national economy.

The Prerov gymnasium is one of the nine experimental gymnasiums in the CSR which started to test a new educational approach, stressing polytechnic and technical education. The new curriculum includes a new compulsory course entitled "Foundations of Technology and Economics" to be taught in the first 2 years and courses in engineering, chemistry, economics and computation in the next 2 years. The purpose of the new educational approach is to offer better preparation for students for their university study and to give them secondary technical education at the same time.

Since 1976, our students have had to pass their "matura" examinations in technical subjects. Their knowledge is very good. Our experience to date has shown that the graduates apply mostly for admission to advanced schools of technology, natural sciences, agriculture, military or economics. The year before last, the figure was 78 percent of the students. This year,

our school graduated 143 students of whom 133 (93 percent) have applied for admission to advanced schools. Of this number, 70 students have selected technical, natural science, military and agricultural disciplines. Thus, it is obvious that in addition to systematic professional orientation, the interest to study at advanced schools is also influenced by the new courses of polytechnic and technical content which toward the end of the second and third year of study at our gymnasium include regular visits to production lines of industrial and agricultural plants. These visits make it possible to verify the results of theoretical study in practice, to familiarize students with production plants and prospects of individual branches of industrial production.

The organization of teaching is now very demanding and requires great effort on the part of instructors. For example, it is necessary to insure systematic production procedures for over 300 students in 29 industrial and agricultural plants. It is necessary to negotiate contracts for all of them concerning the content of their practical training, select assignments and responsible supervisors, secure information concerning labor safety, agree on keeping labor logs, etc.

Students were able to quickly adjust themselves to the environment of the plants. The plants management as well as co-workers evaluate students efforts positively to show themselves at their best. The same experience was also reported by representatives of plants in our okres when they met the representatives of the Czech Ministry of Education and of the kraj teachers' colleges at the club of the Meopta plant in Prerov.

The participants of this meeting had an opportunity to listen to a representative of the Prerov Engineering Works who stated that only those plants which do not think ahead can adopt a negative attitude regarding on-the-job-training of secondary school students. Invaluable help in realizing this effort of ours, namely, the establishment of relationship between the schools and plants, was given by the CPCZ Okres Committee which explained to party members and other citizens the significance of the document concerning further development of the Czechoslovak educational system approved by the presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and the Czechoslovak Government.

The new concept of gymnasium study has brought about big changes also in the internal life of the school. Engineers who possess necessary ideological-political, technical and pedagogical prerequisites and who have necessary experience from working in plants have been recruited as full-time and adjunct teachers. The managements of individual plants release their technicians possessing advanced education for work in our school.

Instruction based on the new study program is not possible without technical workrooms and laboratories. We received help from the secondary agricultural school, secondary economic school, secondary industrial school or mechanical engineering and the apprentice school at which we taught or are still teaching some of the technical subjects. In our 100 year-old school building

we have built classrooms for teaching the foundations of technology and economics, engineering, and technical administration. At present, we are working on the construction of a new classroom for physics and a chemical laboratory which will be used especially for analytical chemistry.

Guidance in the selection of technical and natural science fields of advanced school study does not at all mean any underestimation of preparation for other fields of study. We are paying ever-increasing attention to the teaching of languages because their importance in the training of future advanced school students is growing. We are also paying the greatest possible attention to those students who plan to become teachers. This year 24 of them will enter teachers' colleges.

Top quality work based on the new study plan and a guidance toward a proper selection of the type of advanced school study in harmony with the needs of our society require well thought-out educational work of the entire teachers' collective. The new concept of gymnasium study has become the major topic at meetings, including those organized by the department of education of the North Moravian Kraj National Committee.

We are only at the beginning. The main tasks are ahead of us. The enthusiastic collective of teachers, headed by the top officials of the schools and the help rendered by the plants and the general public are and will remain a prerequisite for the fulfillment of these tasks.

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CONFERENCE HELD ON THIRD WORLD MOVEMENTS

East Berlin DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK in German Vol 24 No 9, Sep 79 signed to press 1 Aug 79 pp 118-127

[Article by Herbert Baumann, Karl-Marx University, Leipzig; Manfred Rusch, and Uli Schmidt, Karl-Marx University, Leipzig: "The National Liberation Movement in Its Present Stage and the Unity of Anti-Imperialist Forces"]

[Text] A scientific conference was held at Karl-Marx University, Leipzig, from 10-12 July 1979 to discuss this group of topics. It was organized by the Central Council for Asian, African and Latin American Sciences in the GDR (ZENTRAAL) and the section African and Mideast Sciences (ANW) at the Karl-Marx University. At the same time it represented the central scientific event for Asian, African and Latin American researchers in the GDR on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of our republic.

Welcoming the delegates Prof M. Voigt, director of the ANW section, stressed that it would be the chief concern of the conference to exchange the latest results of research on the group of topics listed, make them accessible to the decisionmakers and the public in the GDR, and draft scientifically tested arguments for the politico-ideological contest with the enemies of national independence and social progress in the developing countries as well as for firm alliances between the forces of the national and social liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the countries of socialism.

In his inaugural address Prof Lothar Rathmann, chairman of ZENTRAAL and chancellor of the Karl-Marx University, Leipzig, pointed to the major successes of the national liberation movements, which had been achieved since the Red October and with the aid of the victorious working class in the socialist countries. The speaker emphasized the outstanding role of the Soviet Union in this process. Despite many and constantly renewed hostile strategies and actions by imperialism and many retarding factors, the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America has become a force for change in the world, one of the main revolutionary streams of the present time. More and more urgently it presses forward to social progress; its supporters, especially the masses of the peoples, increasingly perceive the

ideals of socialism as the guideline of their actions; increasingly it forces imperialism on the defensive and is demonstrably an important ally in the anti-imperialist struggle all over the world.

This development met with increasing scientific interest in the GDR. Favorable conditions were provided, and these permitted Prof L. Rathmann to claim that the 30 years of the GDR also signify 30 years of an unprecedented surge forward in research on Asia, Africa and Latin America. The leitmotif of the conference's work was the intention to prove the greater capability of the regional sciences by the advanced scientific standard of the papers, confirm the favorable trend of the advances made so far and, at the same time, provide new impetus to further research regarding the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, thereby also making a specific contribution to our republic's solidarity with the peoples of these countries and, most of all, express our thanks to the party and state leadership for their steadfast encouragement of regional sciences.

Prof C. Maehrdel and Prof E. Hackethal (both IMU [Karl-Marx University]) delivered the main report on the topic "the unity of the national and the international in the national and social struggle for liberation by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America at the present time and the strengthening of the unity of anti-imperialist forces." They focused on three key issues:

- The significance of the objective dialectic of the national and the international for the national liberation movement;
- The nature of the interrelation between the national and the international in the national liberation movement;
- The influence of proletarian internationalism on the resolution of the basic problems of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The authors demonstrated the internationalization of many aspects of the social life of our time, including the revolutionary processes. They pointed out that the Marxist-Leninist classics used similar trends to arrive at conclusions for the struggle of the proletariat, and that the international workers movement, principally the leading communist parties of the socialist countries, shape their theoretical considerations and practical policies by taking account of this factor. We thereby obtain a wealth of experiences and relevant examples for dealing with the dialectic of the national and international in the national liberation movement. The authors showed that the dialectic relationship of the national and the international (which, incidentally, should not simply be equated with the interrelation of internal and external factors) is necessarily tied to class interests in the area of the national liberation movement also. According to Lenin the national liberation movement must be appreciated as a relatively independent revolutionary strand in the framework of anti-imperialism. Sooner or later, however, it is bound to produce anticapitalist tendencies, because a genuine resolution of the national and social problems of Asia, Africa and Latin America is no longer

possible within the confines of the capitalist system. This process, for its part, will be merely the consequence of fundamental shifts in the international balance of power.

Describing proletarian internationalism as the "strategic principle" which is of guiding importance also for national liberation movements, the authors go on to sketch the historic dynamic of the dialectic of the national and the international, emphasizing that the priority of the international does not imply lack of esteem of the national but is linked with the latter's simultaneously growing role and the new level of intertwining between the two aspects.

The writers of the principal paper dealt in great detail with the various attempts (whether imperialist, national reformist, Maoist, and so on) to oppose the national to the international and ascribe excessive value to particular national features. These are aimed at splitting the main revolutionary tendencies of our time and designed to deprive the national liberation movement of an essential source of strength provided by their international links.

The paper also proved that the new line of the national liberation movement began with the first victorious proletarian revolution, the Red October of 1917 and also that in the 1970's the successes as well as certain failures of national and social liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America reflect, positively or negatively, the importance of the correct perception of the relation between the national and the international and a corresponding policy of these nations--because by now this has become a matter of governmental decisions.

It was quite properly emphasized that these problems arise as significant elements, as integral parts of the increasingly acute class conflict in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these conflicts the popular masses are more and more involved and, despite temporary and partial reverses, cause the struggle for the renewal of the existential types of human society visibly to gain strength. The national liberation movement is advancing in profundity and sophistication at one and the same time. Its outstanding result is the emergence of two approaches to development in the countries concerned: The socialist approach and the capitalist approach. Experiences have been gained with both. Important changes are proceeding; the paper lists as the most significant the deepening of anti-imperialism and the speed-up in social processes, the further differentiation and polarization in the national and social liberation movements; their growing role in the revolutionary world process; the narrowing of imperialist and racist scope of action in southern Africa; the increasingly practical implementation of objectively warranted alliances with the international working class and the countries of the socialist community, headed by the Soviet Union; the exigency of imperialism which, in view of its defeats, is compelled again to shift its counterrevolutionary and neocolonialist strategy.

In the last section of the paper the authors deal with the issues involved in the dialectic of the national and the international from the aspect of

alliances. They stress that the national and the international offer objective bases for the creation of alliances. The various aspects of the alliance are somewhat independent of each other. At international level, for instance, the policy of alliances may move ahead of the alliance at home, on the other hand the stability of international alliances is ultimately determined by the power constellation inside each country or certain regions and cannot therefore be dealt with by the interrelation of the national and the international.

The principal paper was supplemented by four study group papers which were also read to the full conference.

Prof H. Schilling (I2U) spoke on "the shaping of economic interests in the current stage of the developing countries struggle for economic liberation from imperialism as a factor in the consolidation of the alliance of anti-imperialist forces." His lecture served as the basis for the discussion in study group 1. In his opening remarks Schilling emphasized that the central topic of the conference would also have to be considered from economic aspects. This emphasis reflected the fundamental statements of the classics as well as the practical experiences gathered from the zone of national liberation. The lecturer concentrated on considering the connection between economic interests and the anti-imperialist alliance, related to the internal and external aspect of the overall situation in the former colonial world. He showed clearly that the interests of the developing countries and those of imperialism "are not identical, either as regards their origin or the result intended"; they do not complement one another and cannot possibly represent a "genuine reciprocity" but are able merely to confirm existing contrasts. Schilling sketched the main events and trends exemplified in economic facts and developments. They signify that the economic liberation from imperialism represents the "historic imperative of the current stage of development of the national liberation movement," and this aspect is gaining increasing recognition.

Concerning the basic trend of the economic relations between developing countries and imperialist centers, Schilling considered that the persistent polarization between the main groups of the capitalist world economy represents a system-inherent inevitability which cannot be explained only by the effects of the law of the unequal development of capitalism. Actually we are faced here with something of a special case which reflects the inevitably diverging world economic development of capitalism. The opposite process, that is the economic liberation of the developing countries, should therefore also be considered an economic inevitability. The efforts to overcome economic dependence, backwardness and neocolonialist exploitation are the aspects vitally determining this process, while the national and world economic relations involved stake out the main battlefields in the struggle for economic liberation (including alliances). In this context Schilling quoted as the decisive question that of the type and nature of production conditions in the period of this struggle.

The ensuing discussion in the study group was moderated by Prof H. Faulwetter (IfOe [Advanced School for Economics], Berlin). It was opened by Prof S. Latchinian (ISU). He submitted, among others, the thesis that equality in international economic relations and shifts in the unequal status of the developing countries cannot be achieved within the capitalist division of labor due to the lack of the necessary internal socioeconomic measures for the improvement of the national economy. The subsequent exchange of opinions resulted in agreement on considering "internal" and "external" measures by the developing countries in their dialectic unity: Some speakers objected to the exclusiveness of Latchinian's thesis, and the question was raised whether there were not a certain hierarchization for tackling and resolving these measures. Issues of neocolonialist economic influence which, on the one hand, reflect various imperialist needs for adjustment and, on the other, are evidently designed to weaken and even destroy anti-imperialist alliances at all levels as well as the opportunities and limits in the struggle for economic liberation represented the textual framework for the contributions by R. Fronhoefel (IfOe), T. Friedlaender, Dr K. Kannapin, Dr E. Czaya (all at the IPW [Institute for International Politics and Economics], Berlin), Dr W. Baatz (IIB [Institute for International Relations], Potsdam-Babelsberg), Dr H.-U. Walter (ISU) and Dr J. Schamburg (WPU [Wilhelm-Pieck University], Rostock).

A lively exchange of opinions followed the lecture by Dr V. Schoenes (WPU) who spoke of the problems and trends of socioeconomic differentiation and the development of certain state monopolistic forms and elements in some Latin American countries. In the course of the discussion it was suggested, for example, that it would be wrong in the wake of "leveling phenomena" as encountered variously in Latin America, simply to think in terms of analogies to state monopolistic developments. In fact state monopolistic tendencies and the deepening of underdevelopment are two contradictory aspects of the inevitably diverging development of the capitalist world economy.

Interesting "internal" and international aspects of economic conditions were discussed in the contributions offered by Prof H. Bleckert, G. Abarzua (both WPU), Dr E. Michalski and D Fischer (both ISU). These conditions may advance, channel or obstruct the struggle for economic liberation.

Relevant economic and development theories and conceptions represented the concluding key issue of the discussion. They were debated with respect to their content and target relevance to the alliances. Concerning Latin America and following an interesting retrospective of economic theory Dr S. Flechsig (WPU) sketched two main variants of current ideological readjustment attempts by the imperialists, the "strategy for the development of the home country" and the neomonetarist economic doctrine (Chicago school). Agreeing with Prof P. Stier (IfOe) who talked about the conceptions of "basic needs" or "appropriate technology," Flechsig considers the "strategy for the development of the home country" to represent certain neocolonialist efforts, such as the weakening of social contradictions, the capitalist infiltration of the territory, the deflection of the chief opponent, and so on.

Prof G. Kueck (ISU) emphasized objectively favorable starting points arising from the conception of "collective independence" for the alliances of the developing countries among themselves and with the socialist countries. In conclusion it was stressed that the reactionary and useful aspects in the conceptions mentioned both imply the need for a differentiated scientific and practical approach.

Prof H. Nimschowski read a paper on the topic "politico-social problems of the struggle for the unity of the anti-imperialist-democratic forces in Africa and Asia," designed to start the discussion going in the second study group. The author claimed that, in the 1970's, several Afro-Asian countries have achieved advances in the union of anti-imperialist-democratic forces. At the same time their efforts to make and strengthen sound alliances have always met with the determined resistance of imperialism, actively aided by the Socialist International. The policy of the Peking leadership objectively works in the same direction. Admittedly the influence of imperialism did not fail everywhere, as exemplified by the lecturer who indicated developments in Egypt, Somalia and some other countries.

Despite favorable objective conditions, the issue of alliances in the national liberation movement has proved to be an extraordinarily complex problem affected by the international balance of power as well as by internal factors. In the latter case the most important consideration is the extent of class formation, the actual strength of the classes, the standard of organization and consciousness of the progressive social forces. Scientific analysis of this problem calls for the scrutiny of some important social processes.

Nimschowski then dealt with the dialectic of the level of development of the national liberation revolution and the status of the social classes and strata in the alliance. He spoke primarily of the ability and readiness for alliances of the various social forces, which change as the revolution progresses. In his remarks on the problem of leadership of the liberation movement he indicated the connection between the goals to be accomplished and the ability of the various sociopolitical forces to cope with these tasks. In the countries of Asia and Africa also the transition to the socialist transformation inevitably requires the proletariat to lead the revolutionary process, and in many of these countries therefore the subjective prerequisites for such leadership are being quite consciously created. This is a long process necessitating serious efforts.

In conclusion the lecturer dealt with the types of organization and activities involved in the alliances, their historic import and their limits. An alliance presents itself only when the classes and strata linked by objectively coincident interests actually and quite consciously begin to cooperate. At the same time, depending on the prevailing conditions, alliances may assume very different forms. They cannot be reduced merely to agreements between leadership organizations but must aim mainly at common actions by the masses and achieve completion as to context and form in the course of the revolution.

In the course of the discussion of study group 2 many suggestions of the specific study report as well as of the main paper were taken up and generalized as well as supplemented and documented by specific statements. Prof T. Buettner (ISU) spoke on the anti-imperialist struggle before 1945 and demonstrated that its social bases require differentiated investigation; it will therefore be necessary to embark on important additional research. Dr Dr. Treide (ISU) dealt in detail with the relation between social and ethnic processes. Citing Soviet analyses he demonstrated their interrelations in tropical Africa and provided several interesting suggestions for Marxist-Leninist exploration of these complex social processes.

Dr J. Kunze (ISU) was concerned with the relation of the African bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist alliance and stimulated a broad discussion especially with his thesis that the ability for alliance of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is quickly exhausted.

From the standpoint of the political superstructure Dr H. Hamann (ISU) complemented the general remarks by his statements on the perfection of the political systems in the countries with a socialist orientation. He noted a tendency for these systems to achieve stability and emphasized the positive significance of this process for the political activation of the anti-imperialist-democratic forces and their cooperation.

The discussion was completed by a series of case histories, presented, among others, by W. Bantz (WPU) on the involvement of the Mexican intelligentsia in the alliance, by E. Prohss (ISU) on the role of the mass organizations, by Dr M. Gottschalk (HUB [Humboldt University, Berlin]) on the social and political power situation in Sri Lanka, by Professor Hackethal on the struggle for anti-imperialist unity in the light of the Chilean experience, by Dr A. Krause (ISU) on the land question in India today, by W. Kubish (AGW [Academy for Social Sciences]) on the development of the Algerian working class, by H.-G. Mueller (ISU) on the unity movement for overthrowing the Shah of Iran, by Dr W. Pade (WPU) on the Cuban experience, by B. Pfannenberger (AGW) on the process of political evolution in Ethiopia, by Dr H.-K. Radde (AGW) on the struggle of the Indian Communist Party for left and democratic unity, by L. Schmidt (ISU) on the united front experiences in Syria, by Dr W. Strauch (WPU) on the Mexican labor movement, by D. Wahl (WPU) on anti-imperialist unity efforts in Argentina and by Dr G. Wassilewitsch (Stabi) on topical problems of anti-imperialist unity in Argentina.

These case histories provided many generally valid data. From this aspect special attention is due the contribution by Hackethal who dealt with prominent general aspects of the strategy and tactic of the anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America.

Prof D. Weidemann (HUB), director of study group 2, declared himself satisfied with the discussion but, at the same time, pointed out a certain imbalance, especially with regard to the quantitatively inadequate treatment of historic and political elements.

Dr M. Robbe (AdW-ZIG [Academy of Sciences, Central Institute for History]) gave the introductory report on the topic "the importance of ideology and ideological class conflict in the evolution and consolidation of the anti-imperialist alliance." He dealt in some detail with four key issues:

1. The connection between the role of ideology and the national liberation movement as the shapers of strategy and consciousness. Using current examples he drew attention to the revelation and definition of class lines in the ideological sphere.
2. The investigation of the chief elements in ideological conceptions now held in the developing countries. He dealt especially with religion, nationalism and socialism as well as their interrelations; subsequently discussed were such phenomena as the revitalization of Islam, "Third World collectivism," collective self-confidence, and so on.
3. According to M. Robbe internationalization in the ideological class conflict nowadays signifies "especially polarization: The increasing confrontation between proletarian and bourgeois ideology, the spread of Marxism-Leninism, the necessary contest with anticommunism and anti-Sovietism."
4. In conclusion M. Robbe dealt with the relation between political alliance and critique of ideology. Here he noted: "At the conclusion and consolidation of the political alliance ideology contributes to the definition of the coincidence of interests and, at the same time, to the demarcation of the potential or actual allies. This presumes propaganda among the non-proletarian forces and rejection of attacks by the foe."

The lively discussion in the study group was led by Prof A. Dessau (WPU). It involved a broad spectrum of problems, especially regarding the contemporary ideological conceptions in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as methodology and terminology, ideological polarization, the approach of non-proletarian class forces to Marxism-Leninism, restraining elements, the anti-imperialist alliance, imperialist attempts at exerting ideological influence, and so on.

Dr H. Picht (HUB) stressed that only the communist world movement continues to be able to define and realize the conception for the unity of the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle, and that in Asia too the entire ideological conflict is boiling down to the contradiction between socialist and bourgeois ideology.

His statement also provided the background to the contribution by W. Gruetzmacher (AGW) on the problems of the alliance in Iraq. This was followed up by G. Zein (WU) who spoke on the role of Arab communist parties. Dr G. Hoeppe (AdW-ZIG) gave some explanations on the interpretation of the alliance by Arab revolutionary democrats and pointed out that political alliances cannot be thought of in terms of the ideological abstinence of the partners while, at the same time, it is equally unthinkable for one partner to try "conversion" by physical force.

U.-E. Moltz (WPU) dealt with the topicality of such problems in his contribution on revolutionary democratism in anti-imperialist systems of alliance in Latin America, focusing in particular on events in Nicaragua. Dr E. Friede (IIB) called attention to the ideological attitudes of the leaders of socialist oriented African countries toward the shaping of the international alliance.

A second group of discussions dealt with the forms and methods of consciousness shaping and their material prerequisites. Prof W. Mehnert (ISU) devoted himself to the question of the relation between literacy and the shaping of consciousness among the masses of the peoples. Dr Dr. Baumann (ISU) spoke on educational principles in Arab countries oriented toward socialism. Dr W. Kleinwachter (ISU) and Dr W. Ullrich (ISU) dealt in some detail with the anti-imperialist multilateral cooperation of the developing countries in matters of information and their struggle against "informational imperialism." They mentioned in particular the struggle for a new international system of information. Another aspect in this group of issues was dealt with by Prof H. Stocker (IUB) in his remarks on the role of historiography in the struggle in South Africa.

The final issues discussed concerned the advance of Marxism-Leninism in the national liberation movement and politico-ideological obstacles on the way to the reinforcement of the anti-imperialist alliance. Taking his cue from the introductory paper, Dr H. Ruesten (IUB) spoke on anticommunism and nationalism as ideological obstacles to anti-imperialist unity. Dr U. Schmidt (ISU) and Dr H. Drechsler (Dresden Advanced Pedagogic School) spoke on problems of religion and the role of the school in ideological conceptions in Guinea. U. Schmidt here arrived at the conclusion that the arguments--inspired by religion--in A.S.Toure's ideology are increasingly gaining ground.

Prof X. Buettner (ISU) spoke on the growing attraction Marxism-Leninism exerts in Africa and went into great detail regarding the current ideological processes in Angola and Mozambique.

Concluding the discussion A. Dessau summarized the interesting and useful work which has impressively documented the high standard achieved in this field by comprehensive and interdisciplinary research, and which supplied much material for further study of these topics.

To get going the discussion in study group 4 Prof R. Wuensche (IIB) delivered a lecture on the topic "the anti-imperialist alliance between socialism and national liberation movement--a crucial factor in international relations." The author claimed that the alliance between socialist states and the national liberation movement must be viewed both within the framework of the revolutionary world process and that of international relations. It has been further strengthened in recent years. She submitted some examples, including Comrade Honecker's travels to several Asian and African countries. Professor Wuensche emphasized that this alliance has historic significance in our time. The attacks of imperialism and of the Peking leadership are directed against it.

The lecturer stressed the importance of cooperation between the young nation states and the socialist community as a crucial factor of the progressive efforts of these states. It can become fully effective only, though, if the appropriate internal conditions are present. In that case these conditions objectively exert a beneficial influence on the internal development and foreign political actions of the young nation states. They contribute to the positive evolution of, for example, the policy of nonalignment which varies sharply with respect to its supporters and actual interpretation but, in its basic anti-imperialist orientation, provides a sound basis for cooperation with the foreign policy of socialist countries. The lecturer demonstrated that joint actions are necessary also in the struggle for peace, disarmament, detente, security and peaceful coexistence, and that such actions must in fact be undertaken. This cooperation must be further strengthened in the interest of the resolution of the general problems of mankind as well as the achievement of the concerns of the national liberation movement and socialism, and all accomplishments must be defended against the attacks of imperialist and Maoist forces.

The discussion in study group 4 related especially to the basis of the alliance between the national liberation movement and world socialism, the imperialist counter strategy and the actual shaping of the alliance between the national liberation movement and world socialism. Prof H. Piazza (KNU) indicated the long tradition of this alliance within the scope of the Communist International. He rejected bourgeois doctrines which disqualify this alliance as a tactic of the communist movement and refuse to see its strategic basis.

Prof K.-H. Domdey (HUB) pointed out the necessity in any consideration of the developing countries with a socialist orientation to observe quantitative and qualitative factors in order fully to comprehend their weight and role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Prof H. Lehfeld (SED Advanced Party School, Berlin) talked of the outstanding importance of ideological training for cadres from the developing countries in order to strengthen the development of these countries. Dr A. Bator (HUB) spoke on some topical aspects of U.S. strategy against the national liberation movement. In so doing she disclaimed the opinion that the pragmatic policy of "quick reaction" reflects the lack of strategic guidelines in U.S. policy. Dr G. Liebscher (IIB) dealt with neocolonialist efforts in the FRG aimed at establishing antisocialist alliances with and in the developing countries. L. Gentsch (KNU) was concerned with the role of left radicalism in Western research on developing countries and indicated the necessity for increased ideological challenges to this "left." Dr W. Lulei (HUB) talked about the alliance between the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, mentioning in particular the long established tradition of this friendship. Dr Padel (IIB) spoke of Indian foreign policy at the time of the Desai Government, Dr Oesterheld (IIB) about the role of the GDR-India Friendship Society. Dr E. Roehner (IIB) devoted himself to the problems of the anti-imperialist alliance in the struggle for a democratic peace in the Mideast.

Finally Dr P. Terz submitted an interesting contribution on the attitude of young nation states to basic problems of international law. This talk greatly helped the understanding of the foreign policies of these countries, including their cooperation with socialist countries.

At the conclusion of the conference Kurt Seibt, member of the SED Central Committee and president of the GDR Solidarity Committee, addressed the delegates. His speech was a valuable contribution to the conference because it dealt in some detail with an important incentive to our scientific work--solidarity with the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The speaker emphasized that solidarity which was with us "in the cradle of our republic," represents "a characteristic feature of every genuine socialist movement, an essential and vital condition of our socialist state and generally of all freedom movements the world over."

Kurt Seibt gave an impressive report of German working class solidarity which, on the establishment of the GDR, was made national policy. The examples of this solidarity are well-nigh innumerable. The speaker told the conference that "1978 and the first months of this year...have witnessed the greatest solidarity services yet rendered by the GDR. They are taking their meritorious place in the record of achievement in honor of the GDR's 30th anniversary."

In conclusion Kurt Seibt said: "As scientists and practical politicians dealing with the problems of Asian, African and Latin American countries you have a vital share in the development of our solidarity movement. This conference also is a contribution to anti-imperialist solidarity."

The conference delegates have interpreted this statement not only as praise for work done in the past. In fact they considered it primarily a stimulus for the further improvement and intensification of scientific work, a contribution to the strengthening of our republic and its capacity.

The conference generally represented a high point in the scientific and political life of the institutions devoted to research concerned with the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It documented the progress achieved, the growing knowledge and greater ability to conduct a more factual and party-like clash of opinions. The best evidence was represented not only by the roughly 80 pre-announced speeches but by the even more numerous spontaneous contributions to the discussion. The growing potential of regional scientific research in our republic at the time of its 30th anniversary was also reflected in the welcome attendance of many young speakers.

Lastly the conference made it possible to illuminate "white" or "gray" spots of our work (the term used by many to describe still inadequately researched areas). The correct utilization of this acknowledgment is of vital importance.

Publication of the most important conference contributions in No 6/1979 of the magazine ASIEN, AFRIKA, LATEINAMERIKA is a useful and welcome project.

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS ANALYZED

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[Article by Prof Dr Hans Beyer, Franz Mehring Institute, Karl Marx University:
"Problems of the Revolutionary World Process in Our Present Time"]

[Text] 1. The Objective Conditions Requisite for the Socialist Revolution

The socialist revolution is an historical necessity; ultimately, it results from the laws inherent in capitalism. Through the development of the productive forces, capitalism creates the essential material conditions leading to its own demise, i.e. to the socialist revolution. As capitalism entered the monopolistic stage, the material conditions necessary for the establishment of socialism reached their full development. Lenin stated: "State monopoly capitalism represents the total material preparation for socialism; it is the stage directly preceding socialism, for on the stairway of history there are no intermediate stages between this stage and the stage called socialism."¹

In consequence of the development of monopolistic capitalism, there intensified the uneven development of the capitalist countries and at the same time the uneven maturation of the material preconditions for the socialist revolution. In accordance with the developmental level of these preconditions, one can today divide the countries of the nonsocialist world into the following principal groups²:

The first group is composed of the highly developed capitalist countries. Its most important members are the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan. In these countries of state monopoly capitalism, the antagonistic contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalistic appropriation of the means and results of production has been carried to extremes. The private entrepreneurs are no longer able--not even in the monopolistic and multinational framework--to insure and control the development of the productive forces. At present, the monopolistic state is the determining factor in the management of the national and multinational production processes. In various

economic sectors, the monopoly bourgeoisie has begun to subject production to state control, even though such a policy is at variance with the nature of capitalistic private property. The state acts as employer and economic regulator and represents the interests of the monopolies. Thus the state's entire economic policy is ultimately subordinated to the multimillionaires' egotistical pursuit of profit. It is only through the political power and increasing economic activity of the state that the private capitalistic ownership of the means of production can be maintained. The requirements of the scientific-technological revolution necessitate great financial expenditures: It is especially the research expenditures and the implementation of large-scale scientific-technological projects that are no longer practicable without direct state support. In less profitable sectors, the private expenditures are replaced by state expenditures. The monopolies receive from the state billions in credits and other support and services that are financed with public funds and the citizens' savings deposits. All this testifies to the fact that capitalism has had its day, that its continued existence is anachronistic.

Aside from the highly developed capitalistic countries, there are numerous countries characterized by an average level of capitalistic development. This--second--group includes Greece, Spain, Mexico and Brazil. These countries have likewise largely accomplished the transition to the state monopoly system and they have much in common with the highly developed countries of state monopoly capitalism. However, due to the low level of development and partly on account of the delayed start of capitalistic development, most of these countries are economically dependent on the highly developed countries.

Portugal has since 1975 been occupying a special position. The Portuguese revolution ousted the native Portuguese monopoly capital from its power positions and triggered an antimonopolistic, democratic upheaval. Since the end of the revolution, the people's revolutionary forces have been fighting under the direction of the Portuguese Communist Party for the preservation of the antimonopolistic, democratic accomplishments; they are opposed by the reactionary forces which with government support want to undo these accomplishments and who have already returned numerous enterprises to private ownership.

The third group is composed of the countries characterized by a low level of capitalistic development. For various reasons (e.g. colonial oppression), these countries were late in starting their capitalistic development. In most of the countries of this group, there remain--in part significant--residues of feudalism in the agricultural sector. But in this group, too, the formation of domestic monopoly capital has already begun. Many countries of this group are economically highly dependent on the developed capitalist countries so that internal class oppression is complemented by external oppression. This category includes Turkey, India, Pakistan and numerous Latin American countries. In these countries, the internal material conditions necessary for bringing on the socialist revolution are insufficiently developed, but due to the national industrial development they are maturing rapidly.

The fourth group includes most of the countries that in the last few decades freed themselves from colonial oppression. In these countries, the internal material preconditions for the socialist revolution are not yet present; this goes also for those countries in which strong, active and--in part--socialist mass movements have developed.

Apart from the degree of material maturity examined so far, there are other--sociopolitical--conditions that are necessary for bringing on the social revolution. In the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, the respective conditions are called objective conditions of the socialist revolution. Whereas full material development is a precondition for the transition to socialism as the first developmental phase of the communist society, the sociopolitical conditions are prerequisite for the beginning and unfolding of the revolutionary process itself. The revolution does not begin automatically when the material conditions necessary for the establishment of socialism are present. The revolution can be started only if the necessary sociopolitical requirements are met. These include above all the development of the antagonism between the working class and the bourgeoisie, the intensification of the class struggle, the readiness of large segments of the population to act independently, a distribution of forces favorable to the revolutionary forces, and in particular the weakening of the control system of the capitalistic state. Lenin stated that the tasks of the socialist revolution "could be accomplished only after capitalism has created the basic economic, social, cultural and political preconditions."³

2. Problems Concerning the Dialectics of Economics and Politics, Basis and Superstructure

A crucial problem in the present revolutionary world process is the fact that highly developed capitalist countries such as the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Japan which in terms of material conditions are "overripe" for socialism lack the sociopolitical conditions necessary for bringing on the socialist revolution. At present, the revolutionary world process is advancing most rapidly in some African countries in which in regard to internal development the material preconditions for socialism are insufficiently developed. The course of the revolutionary world process shows that in the various countries the development of the material conditions necessary for socialism and of the sociopolitical preconditions for the socialist revolution is very uneven and that there is no direct correlation between the rates of development of the two objective prerequisites. These problems are of great importance for the current revolutionary theory and practice.⁴

It is on account of imperialism--which in the individual countries develops very unevenly, by fits and starts, and which contains a great many contradictions--that the objective conditions and the subjective factor underlying the revolution mature unevenly and that the revolutionary processes succeed in those places where the chain links of the imperialist world system are the weakest. These conclusions, at which Lenin arrived upon analyzing imperialism,

are confirmed by the revolutionary events, first and foremost by the Great Socialist October Revolution. As early as March 1918, Lenin stated "that the socialist world revolution in the advanced countries cannot start as easily as did the revolution in Russia.... In a country of this type, the beginning of the revolution was easy, it was child's play."⁵ Later, Lenin added that in Western Europe "it is much more difficult to rise up; there the proletarian revolution is much slower in coming."⁶

Why is it that in some of the developed capitalist countries the conditions are so unfavorable to revolution? Lenin observed already at that time that in the developed capitalist countries the revolution "meets with incomparably greater resistance and counterpressure."⁷ The struggle against the idiot Romanov or the braggart Kerensky was a different matter; but here we are dealing with an enemy who has organized all his forces and the entire economic life of the country in order to protect himself from the revolution."⁸ As regards the material preconditions for socialism, state monopoly capitalism embodies the highest level; but on the other hand, it created conditions, i.e. above all a superstructure, which delays maturation of the conditions--the sociopolitical conditions as well as the subjective factor--necessary for bringing on the revolution. In the developed capitalist states, the working class is confronted with a centralistically organized and experienced opponent who can fall back on a centralized, well-established mechanism of control. For its protection, the imperialist bourgeoisie has created military forces equipped with the latest weapons technology. Lenin emphasized that the "shell of imperialism is made of high-grade steel."⁹

Monopoly capitalism has at its disposal a powerful, advanced production mechanism and it can draw on high labor productivity. Thus it is able to counter the pressure of the workers' class struggle with social concessions and partially satisfy the demands of the workers. In this connection, one should bear in mind that on account of the growing influence of socialism and the increased strength of the labor movement and of the trade unions in the capitalist countries in particular, the conditions of the struggle for implementation of economic and social demands have improved since the beginning of the 1960's. In severe class conflicts, the working class in the developed capitalist countries has been able to wrest significant concessions from the capitalists.

Aside from the "policy of concessions" and the methods of suppression by the monopolistic state power, the manipulation of public opinion through the mass media is presently the monopoly capitalists' preferred method of keeping the masses down. By skillfully taking advantage of the concessions made to the workers and of the results of the scientific-technological revolution (mass production of durable consumer goods), the monopolists through their manipulation have concealed the true nature of the state monopoly system of exploitation; they have succeeded in creating a "consumption ideology" which restricts the horizon of many workers to the narrow confines of individual material consumption and which diverts the workers from the basic problems of the class struggle. At the same time, they have created the illusion that

the working class can attain its objectives within the framework of the capitalist system, without a revolutionary reorganization of society. The permanent manipulation deforms the political consciousness of the people and the continuous propagation of anticommunist ideas has given rise to a basic attitude of anticommunism in large segments of the population; in the Federal Republic of Germany, this is true of the majority of the citizens.¹⁰

In the capitalist countries, the correlation between imperialism and opportunism has intensified as well. Foremost among the factors impeding the development of the conditions necessary for bringing on the revolution are social reformism and revisionism. Both of these factors cause constant confusion for the masses and serve to split the workers' movement. This goes especially for those states in which the power is in the hands of Social Democrats pursuing a policy oriented primarily toward capitalist objectives.

The objective conditions of the class struggle in several capitalist countries of Europe will be increasingly affected by the integration processes with which the development of these countries is bound up. As is well known, a key driving force behind the integration efforts is the reactionary and anti-communist attitude of the monopoly capitalists. It is quite possible that in connection with the integration processes new difficulties will arise in regard to the development of the sociopolitical preconditions for the socialist revolution. This is evidenced by the repeated threats addressed to Italy by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that in the event of communist participation in the government credits would be stopped and investments restricted. The working class in the EEC countries is presently confronted not by the individual capitalist, by the monopoly capital of the country, but by the internationally organized monopoly capital. Monopoly capitalism is trying to coordinate all forces for the struggle against social progress. Thus the international solidarity of the revolutionary labor movement and of all antimonopolistic forces in the struggle against imperialism is becoming more and more important.

In contrast to the highly developed capitalist countries, the revolutionary process in several young nation states, which attained their independence in the 1950's and 1960's and in some cases as late as the 1970's, has been making considerable progress since the attainment of independence, even though the material preconditions for socialism are insufficiently developed in these countries. Several of these countries have opted for a socialist course. Erich Honecker stated in this regard: "On three continents, the nations are engaged in building the new socialist society, and now socialism is gaining a foothold on the fourth continent."¹¹ The national liberation movement is a current of the revolutionary world process, which is allied with the working class. The foundations of this alliance were laid by imperialism through colonialism and neocolonialism. The joint struggle waged against imperialism by the socialist states, the working class of the capitalist countries, and the national liberation movement furthers the trend toward a socialist orientation in the young nation states of Asia and Africa. The general democratic, anti-imperialist struggle is bound to approximate

the socialist struggle; consequently, the representatives of national revolutionary democracy are increasingly guided by the theory of scientific socialism.

In our age--an age characterized by the global transition from capitalism to socialism, by the existence of a powerful socialist world system and by a shift in the international distribution of forces in favor of socialism--the young nation states of Asia and Africa have the opportunity to pursue a non-capitalist course of development, followed by the transition to socialism. At the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin demanded--in the report by the Commission for the National and Colonial Question--the establishment and theoretical substantiation of the principle "that with the support of the proletariat of the most advanced countries, the backward countries can attain the Soviet order and--via certain developmental stages--communism, while bypassing the capitalist stage of development."¹² The support of the Soviet Union, for example, enabled the Mongolian People's Republic to skip the capitalist stage. The existence of the socialist world system enables the economically backward peoples of Africa and Asia to follow the socialist course of development, while bypassing the full development of the capitalist mode of production.

In the African countries and in several Asian countries, the developmental conditions are especially complex, since aside from the low, backward level of the productive forces, there persists for some time--even after the national liberation--the old colonial basis. Thus, changing the economic basis is an important task the accomplishment of which is prerequisite for total national liberation and for the continuation of the revolutionary process. However, the immediate revolutionary transformation of society into a socialist society is not feasible in these countries, since they lack the material preconditions. Their low developmental level necessitates a lengthy preparatory phase, during which the material preconditions for socialism must first be created. "It goes without saying that this is a difficult task for the young states whose development was for hundreds of years impeded by the colonialists. For now it is necessary to create productive forces on the level required by socialism, to establish totally new production relations."¹³ The preparatory phase preceding the socialist transformation is a highly complex and contradictory process. At the Third FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] Congress at the beginning of February 1977, S. M. Machel called the people's democracy a long historical stage, during which the economy is developed and qualitatively transformed, while the material foundations of the socialist society are laid.¹⁴ The program of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Labor Party states: "The country is presently going through the stage of national democratic revolution which is a transitional period preceding the development of socialism."¹⁵

On account of the existence of the socialist countries and with their support, it is possible to speed up the revolutionary process in the young nation states of Africa and Asia and thus to shorten the preparatory phase preceding the socialist transformation. Close friendly relations with the socialist

countries are of crucial importance for the success and the pace of the revolution in the young nation states. Whereas in the developed capitalist countries the economic foundations of socialism can be established on the high level attained by the productive forces and by the scientific-technological revolution in particular, the young nation states must focus on industrialization in the preparation and implementation of the socialist revolution. What Lenin in his time said in regard to the preconditions for the revolution in Russia and in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe applies even more to the present revolutionary world process: "Anyone who has analyzed the economic preconditions for the socialist revolution in Europe must realize that in Europe it is incomparably harder, and in our country, immeasurably easier to start the revolution, but that here it will be more difficult than there to continue the revolution."¹⁶

The development in Africa shows: The more the substance of our age prevails, the more comprehensive and radical the revolutionary world process develops, the greater is the number of new problems that arise in regard to the revolutionary theory and practice. One such problem is related to the role of the superstructure in countries which are oriented toward a socialist development, but in which the material basis for socialism is insufficiently developed. Whereas in the imperialist states the superstructure is an extremely conservative, reactionary institution, which primarily serves to insure the supremacy of monopoly capitalism, various parts of the superstructure in many of the young nation states of Africa and Asia are progressive institutions in the hands of the democratic and revolutionary forces. In some countries, the armed forces--and the body of officers in particular--are a progressive factor.

Due to the great importance of the superstructure and the underdeveloped material basis, the contradictoriness and the complexity of the development are intensified and there arise problems that increase the risk of the revolutionary development. Here one has to take into consideration the relative instability of the political leadership in some countries. For the most part, the leaders come from a petit-bourgeois background.¹⁷ Thus it is possible that if there are changes in the superstructure, a country, which has so far been pursuing a progressive policy, will change the political and economic course followed so far. Aside from the close cooperation with the socialist states and the establishment of the economic and cultural basis in preparation for the socialist revolution, the development of an avant-garde party that will gradually turn into a workers' party, that is closely linked with the majority of the workers and that is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism is a task requisite for the success of the revolutionary process. In this way, the superstructure, and the state apparatus in particular, is given greater stability and the revolutionary masses can follow an avant-garde.

Naturally, the important and progressive function that the superstructure performs in the young nation states has its limits--limits that are rooted in the material basis of society. This must be taken into consideration. Experience shows that attempts to dispose of the requirements of objective laws in a subjectivist-voluntaristic fashion and instead to take "great leaps" in

the revolutionary development are bound to result in economic and political failure. Socialism cannot be established through "wishful thinking," but only through the establishment of the material foundations.

3. Questions Concerning the Development of Revolutionary Situations in the Capitalist Countries

Then the contradictions that create the sociopolitical preconditions for the socialist revolution come to a head, i.e. when the class struggle is greatly intensified, when it involves all social classes and strata, thus resulting in a national crisis and pushing the masses toward active struggle, there arises a revolutionary situation.¹⁸ The class struggles that in the 1970's have intensified in several capitalist states of Europe testify to the fact that the contradictions of the capitalist society have come to a head and that certain events can suddenly and for an unexpected reason give rise to a revolutionary situation. Thus in Portugal in 1974, there developed--quickly and unexpectedly--a revolutionary situation, which was in large measure due to the military uprising against the fascist dictatorship and against the continuation of the colonial war in Africa and which resulted in revolution. Evidence of the possibility of the development of revolutionary situations in the capitalist countries are the extent of the strike movement and the high incidence of social conflicts. These struggles illustrate the "lower classes'" desire for changes.

In many capitalist countries, the internal situation is extremely tense and the political conditions have become increasingly unstable. An indication of this instability is the fact that at present there is probably not a single capitalist country in Europe whose government is supported by a stable parliamentary majority. A great number of the governments of the European capitalist countries are unstable and in constant danger of being overthrown. Today it is more difficult for the "upper classes" to rule in the old style. However, in evaluating the strikes and conflicts in the developed capitalist countries, one must bear in mind that the workers are fighting to secure and improve their position and that in doing so they do not want to call in question or jeopardize what they have gained through long and hard struggles.

The shifts in the international distribution of forces to the disadvantage of imperialism and in favor of socialism, which have been taking place since the end of the 1950's, and the growth of the workers' movement in some capitalist countries in the 1970's open up new fighting opportunities to the revolutionary workers' movement in some capitalist countries. The communist parties of the capitalist countries of Europe hold that extensive opportunities for radical social changes have developed and that conditions are more favorable now for political changes.¹⁹ The Italian Communists believe that the Italian workers' movement is presently "on the threshold of that crucial period which will be characterized by the exercise of power at the head of the national political leadership."²⁰ The high developmental level which the sociopolitical preconditions for revolution have reached in some capitalist countries allows the realization of radical social transformations and thus the

beginning of a revolutionary process. It is quite possible that the leftist forces of a country--supported by a broad antimonopolistic alliance between the working class and the other working strata--take over the government and enforce antimonopolistic measures.

Of great value is the experience gained in the Chilean revolution. In November 1970, Salvador Allende became President of Chile and the Unidad Popular formed the Chilean Government. At this time, a revolutionary situation did not exist in Chile. V. Teitelboim speaks of a "prerevolutionary situation."²¹ The sociopolitical preconditions had attained a high degree of maturity which had not reached the threshold of a revolutionary situation, but which had developed to a point at which the Unidad Popular Government was able to take radical antimonopolistic measures such as the nationalization of monopolistic enterprises. In the course of the struggle for an antimonopolistic democracy, there emerged a revolutionary situation.²²

The enforcement of antimonopolistic-democratic measures provokes the resistance of both the domestic and the international monopoly capital and thus is bound to intensify the class struggle. Once the struggle against monopoly capitalism has led to radical, antimonopolistic measures, the class struggle can no longer be arrested; under these conditions, the revolutionary struggle necessitates a solution of the power problem. It is a law of all socialist revolutions that in the phase of the revolutionary process in which the exploited, the oppressed, the revolutionaries try to wrest the resources of power from the exploiters and to take them into their own hands the class struggle comes to a head and reaches its maximum intensity. This is the lesson learned by the workers' movement in several countries. "We know and always knew," stated E. Berlinguer, "that the ruling social circles and their power apparatus opposed by all means available to them the advance of the working classes and of democracy. And we know--and this has been confirmed by Chile's tragic experience--that the greater the advances of the people in their conquest of the power positions of the state and society, the greater the violence and cruelty of the antidemocratic reaction."²³

We know from past experience that the revolutionary phase, during which the power of the monopolies is broken and antimonopolistic democracy is established, is especially complex. Inherent in the tremendous economic power of the monopolies is the urge toward political reaction and violence. Once the political and economic power of the monopolies has been broken, the principal obstacle on the road toward socialism is removed. In wresting the power from the monopolies, one breaks the backbone of capitalism. The struggle for antimonopolistic democracy results in revolutionary conditions, under which a new stage of the revolutionary process can be initiated--the transition to the socialist revolution. Antiimperialist-democratic transformations help to make the working masses aware of the necessity of farther-reaching, radical and crucial economic and political changes. Lenin called this personal political awareness, which the masses acquire in the revolutionary struggle, a fundamental law of all great revolutions.²⁴

4. Problems Concerning the Dialectics of Objective Relativity and Subjective Factor

The existence of the objective preconditions for the socialist revolution opens up the actual possibility of revolution. But this does not mean that the revolution will begin automatically. Whether the possibility will turn into reality is contingent upon the degree of maturity of the subjective factor. "Neither the oppression of the lower classes nor the crisis of the upper classes can bring on the revolution--they only place the country into a state of decomposition--if this country lacks a revolutionary class capable of transforming the passive state of oppression into the active state of rebellion and insurrection."²⁵ Lenin stated that a revolution occurs only if "in addition to the objective changes there is a subjective change, namely the capacity of the revolutionary class to engage in revolutionary mass actions, sufficiently strong to overthrow the old government (or to unsettle it) which never, not even at a time of crisis, 'suffers a collapse,' unless it is 'made to collapse.'"²⁶

It was Lenin who dialectically examined the objective process and who emphasized the subjective factor. In consequence of this work, Lenin unequivocally opposed all forms of objectivism, the view that separates the revolutionary subject from the objective process. In contrast to Lenin, Karl Kautsky advocated an objectivist point of view, which denied the subjective factor and which regarded the revolution as an inevitable event caused by fate. Kautsky stated in this respect: "Social Democracy is a revolutionary party, but not a party that starts a revolution. We know that our objectives can be attained only through a revolution; but we also know that just as our enemies are incapable of preventing this revolution, we are incapable of starting it. Thus we do not intend to instigate or prepare for a revolution.... We know that the proletariat continues to increase in size and economic strength and that thus its victory and the defeat of capitalism are inevitable, but we can only speculate as to when and how the last decisive battles in this social war will be fought."²⁷

The principal elements of the subjective factor are the following: The revolutionary consciousness of the masses, i.e. that the majority of the working class and large segments of the middle classes become aware of their own economic and political interests, which are opposed to those of the bourgeoisie, and that the majority of the working class is prepared and determined to enforce these interests against the resistance of the bourgeoisie; the political organization of the working class and its allies, which allows them to coordinate their efforts and to concentrate their forces, and in regard to which the cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats/Socialists is of special importance; guidance of the masses by a party that is experienced and trusted by the masses, that is capable of developing a scientific strategy for the revolutionary struggle and that is determined to implement this strategy against the opposition of the bourgeoisie. At the present time, the communist and workers' parties that are guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism are parties of this type.

The objective conditions and the subjective factor must not be viewed mechanically, independent of each other. The revolutionary process is always an integral whole comprising both objective relativity and subjective action. Between the objective conditions and the subjective factor, there is no rigid boundary; the two sides permeate each other and they should be separated only for purposes of logical analysis. Usually, it is the progressive class that is the subject of the revolution. Other classes and strata that on account of their social position are interested in the revolution can ally themselves with the progressive class; in this way, they likewise become the subject of the revolution.

The dialectics of objective relativity and subjective action is manifested also in the subject of the revolution. The driving forces behind the revolution have an objective and a subjective aspect. The objective aspect is the emergence and development of the class, its position in the historical process. The subjective aspect is the understanding of the historical tasks, the fusion of the class into an organized political power, the political-ideological development. In other words: If the proletariat has to carry out the revolution, this means at the same time that it must in itself create the conditions that make it the revolutionary subject. Engels stated: "To explore its historical conditions and thus its own nature and thereby to make the class, which is called to action and which presently is oppressed, aware of the conditions and nature of its own action is the task of the theoretical aspect of the proletarian movement, of scientific socialism."²⁸

In the last 20 years, the importance of the subjective factor for the revolution has increased considerably. On account of the development and consolidation of the socialist world system and as a result of the shifts in the international distribution of forces to the advantage of socialism, it was possible to force the imperialist states to drop the policy of military threats and blackmail and adopt a policy of international detente. This policy intensifies the ideological disputes between the two systems, and thus the subjective factor in the class conflicts assumes greater importance.

All of the socialist revolutions that have so far been victorious--with the exception of the Cuban revolution--occurred more or less as a result of wars between states and they occurred primarily in countries in which the army in the course of the war received crushing blows or lost the war. This development aggravated the crisis of the bourgeois system of domination; the bourgeoisie was weakened and the distribution of forces shifted to the advantage of the revolutionary masses. The sociopolitical conditions for the beginning of the revolution improved considerably, thus furthering the emergence of the revolutionary situation. The revolutionary situation and the transition from this situation to the revolution was caused primarily by spontaneously operative factors that emerged due to the consequences of the war. The effect of these factors was so strong that the revolutionary struggle unfolded even in places--such as Germany during the November revolution of 1918/19--where the developmental level of the subjective factor fell far short of the developmental level of the objective conditions. Once the process of international

political detente develops further and once the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems prevails, war as a "spontaneously explosive" factor in the development of revolutionary situations disappears, and thus the subjective factor continues to increase in importance. Its role is further influenced and enhanced by the scientific-technological revolution.

Now more than ever, the readiness and maturity of the subjective factor are necessary so that the objective possibility can in fact turn into a revolutionary process. There have been instances in which revolutionary situations did not lead to revolutionary developments, since the necessary subjective preconditions were lacking. In such cases, the revolutionary situation fades away. The unity and harmony between the objective conditions and the subjective factor is a condition requisite for the successful execution of the revolution.

In Chile, the revolutionary struggle of 1972/73 had resulted in the development of a revolutionary situation. This situation could not be utilized for raising the revolution to a new, higher stage, since the subjective factor was insufficiently developed. Large segments of the population were not prepared to support the Unidad Popular. The Unidad Popular did not succeed in creating a broad and stable alliance with the middle classes and in winning the majority of the population over to the continuation of the revolutionary process. This was one of the principal causes underlying the defeat of the revolution. Large segments of the urban middle classes sided with the counter-revolution, and thus the distribution of forces turned out to be unfavorable for the continuation of the revolution.²⁹ Not least on account of Chile's geographic location, the international distribution of forces, too, was not very advantageous to the Chilean revolution. History shows that when the subjective preconditions for the revolutionary process are insufficiently developed, the reactionary, fascist forces take advantage of a national crisis.

In Portugal, a revolutionary process had been started in the spring of 1974 in connection with the armed uprising of the armed forces; this process resulted in significant, antimonopolistic-democratic upheavals. "The Portuguese revolution thus established the foundations for its orientation toward socialism."³⁰ It proved impossible to transform the revolutionary process in Portugal into the socialist revolution, since, as V. Goncalves pointed out, "the subjective preconditions were lacking that would have allowed the power of the democratic and progressive forces to consolidate itself in the sense of a transition to socialism."³¹

The subjective factor, the readiness of the majority of the working class and of the classes allied with it, and the capacity and determination of the revolutionary party to fulfill the historical tasks at hand are crucial for the development and success of the revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, "On 'Leftist' Childishness and Petit-Bourgeois Attitudes," in: W.I. Lenin, "Werke" [Works], Vol 27, Berlin, 1960, p 334.
2. See "Grundlagen des historischen Materialismus" [Foundations of Historical Materialism], Berlin, 1976, pp 560 ff.
W.W. Sagladin, "Die kommunistische Weltbewegung" [The Communist World Movement], Berlin, 1973, pp 101 ff.
3. V.I. Lenin, "Original Draft of the Article 'The Soviet Power's Next Tasks,'" in: W.I. Lenin, op. cit., suppl vol October 1917-March 1923, Berlin, 1973, p 42.
4. See V.V. Zagladin, "The Preconditions of Socialism and the Struggle for Socialism," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 10/11, 1975.
5. V.I. Lenin, "The Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," op. cit., Vol 27, p 85.
6. V.I. Lenin, "Speech at the Conference of Executive Committee Chairmen of the District and Village Soviets of the Moscow Oblast," op. cit., Vol 31, Berlin, 1959, p 320.
7. V.I. Lenin, "Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Education and Socialist Culture," op. cit., Vol 29, Berlin, 1961, p 531.
8. V.I. Lenin, "Speech Before the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Farmers' and Red Army Deputies," op. cit., Vol 27, p 154.
9. V.I. Lenin, "On 'Leftist' Childishness ...," op. cit., p 332.
10. See E. Honecker, "Die Aufgaben der Partei bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der Beschlüsse des IX. Parteitages der SED" [The Tasks of the Party in the Further Implementation of the Resolutions Adopted by the Ninth SED Congress], Berlin, 1978, p 21.
11. Ibid., p 10.
12. V. I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International," op. cit., Vol 31, p 232.
13. L.I. Bresh'nev, "Auf dem Wege Lenins" [In Lenin's Footsteps], Vol 2, Berlin, 1971, p 629.
14. See "The Central Objective: The Establishment of the Foundations of Socialism. From the Central Committee Report of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), Delivered by Samora Moises Machel," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 5/6 Feb 77, p 6.

15. D. Coburger, "The MPLA Labor Party Is Implementing the Resolutions of the First Party Congress," *HORIZONT*, No 14, 1978, p 11.
16. V.I. Lenin, "The Seventh Party Congress ...," *op. cit.*, pp 79 ff.
17. See "The Revolutionary Process in the Socialist-Oriented Countries of Africa," *PROBLEME DES FRIEDENS UND DES SOZIALISMUS*, No 1, 1978, p 83.
18. V.I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International," *op. cit.*, Vol 21, Berlin, 1960, p 206.
19. See "Political Declaration of the Brussels Conference of the Communist Parties of the Capitalist Countries of Europe," *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, 1 Feb 74, p 6.
20. "The Dialectics of Economics and Politics During the Period of Struggle for a Revolutionary Transformation of Society," *PROBLEME DES FRIEDENS UND DES SOZIALISMUS*, No 3, 1978, p 356.
21. V. Teitelboim, "Reflections on the 1000 Days of the Unidad Popular," *ibid.*, No 1, 1977, p 48.
22. See P. Rodriguez, "The Problem of Protecting the People's Power," *ibid.*, No 6, 1977, pp 772 ff.
23. E. Berlinguer, "Democratic Development and Reactionary Violence. Reflections on Italy After the Events in Chile," in: E. Berlinguer, "Fuer eine demokratische Wende. Ausgewahlte Reden und Schriften. 1969-1974" [For Democratic Change. Selected Speeches and Writings], Berlin, 1975, p 370.
24. V.I. Lenin, "'Leftist' Radicalism, a Childhood Disease of Communism," *op. cit.*, Vol 31, p 80.
25. V.I. Lenin, "The May Demonstrations of the Revolutionary Proletariat," *op. cit.*, Vol 19, Berlin, 1962, p 213.
26. V.I. Lenin, "The Collapse ...," *op. cit.*, p 207.
27. K. Kautsky, "Weg zur Macht" [Road to Power], Berlin, 1909, p 44.
28. F. Engels, "Mr Eugen Duehring's Transformation of Science," in: K. Marx/F. Engels, "Werke" [Works], Vol 20, Berlin, 1962, p 265.
29. See R. Castillo, "Lessons of the Revolution," *PROBLEME DES FRIEDENS UND DES SOZIALISMUS*, No 7, 1974, pp 959 ff.
30. "From Fascism to Democracy. From the Theses of the Portuguese Communist Party Issued on the Occasion of Its Eighth Congress," *INFORMATIONSBULLETIN*, Vienna, No 22, 1976, p 28.
31. "On the Good Fortune of the Revolutionary. Interview With Portugal's Former Prime Minister, Vasco Goncalves," *HORIZONT*, No 18, 1978, p 21.

SED INFLUENCE IN WORKERS MILITIA UNITS HELD ESSENTIAL

East Berlin DER KÄMPFER in German Vol 23 No 9, Sep 79 p 2

[Article by R. Haarbach and R. Velt, VEB Chemical Combine, Bitterfeld: "Leading Role of SED--Guarantor for Successful Development; Purposeful Political-Ideological Work in Party Collectives"]

[Text] The formation of the VEB Chemical Combine at Bitterfeld a decade ago and the consequent creation of a discreet kreis party organization laid not only qualitatively new foundations for a continuous rise in material production, but also for the work of the kreis party organization and thus also for a continuous rise in the combat readiness of units of the working class combat groups. The leadership of the industry kreis of the SED, its secretariat and the personal concrete direction of the first secretary, Comrade Werner Czogalla, acting through the secretaries of the basic organizations, shaped the political-ideological, material-technical and organizational prerequisites for this continuous development. The necessary reform of the battle group in 1973 included the idea of increasing the responsibility of the basic organization of the party. This was achieved by forming units on the basis of the basic organizations. In other words, current practice dictates that only single or a few basic organizations supply the men and commanders for a unit, and have to warrant the structural strength of the unit, to include the necessary reserves. Every unit was assigned to a responsible secretary of the basic organization; where several basic organizations form a 100-man unit the responsibility extends down to the platoons. No training or other activity of the combat group takes place without being planned and executed jointly by the party organization and commanders. Thus the socialist competition within the battle groups has also become a competition between the basic organizations.

Coordination between the secretary of the basic organization and the cadre of commanders is one side of the issue. The other, decisive one, is the political-ideological education of every member of the battle groups by the appropriate party organization. Thus problems of state defense are included in the agenda of APO membership meetings; moreover, between training days assemblies of members of the battle groups are called within

the platoons' party groups by the basic organization. In this connection the political organs within the unit have gained an even greater importance. This finds its expression in the more concrete political-ideological work of the appropriate party organization, and in the increased mission readiness among the fighters.

The leading role of the kreis party organization as the decisive mainspring of all successes of units of the battle groups is further expressed in the assemblies of the battle group activists, in the transfer of responsibility for a unit to every member of the secretariat, the appointment of members of the plant management as trustees for a unit, as well as the appointment of experienced and distinguished comrades to the honorific working group.

The decisions of the kreis management regarding the creation of a material-technical basis securing an exemplary internal order have in no small measure contributed to the development of the combat groups. Thanks to the constant concrete direction, assistance and control of the kreis party organization the combat strength and battle readiness of our unit has been further increased. We have succeeded in always meeting our planned strength including the required reserves. The 97-percent participation was the average at programed training. Combat readiness during alerts was achieved during the allotted time to a 93.5 percent and 90 percent extent.

Training norms including marksmanship results have been met by evaluations of "very good" and "good" on the average. Inspection of arms and internal order resulted in no criticism. The high degree of mission readiness of all fighters, NCOs and commanders was rewarded with the nomination of our 100-man-unit as the best unit on several occasions, with the decoration of the unit with the "medal for distinguished achievements in the Battle Groups of the Working Class," as well as numerous individual decorations. Similar fine results have been achieved by all units of our chemical combine, and they also are making every effort to increase their mission potential and combat readiness further in honor of the 30th anniversary of our German Democratic Republic, in order to protect dependably our achievements at all times and in all conditions.

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CSO: 2300

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

MEDIA FOCUS ON PROPERTY CRIMES

West German Commentary

Munich SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 7 Sep 79 p 9

[Article, datelined 6 Sep, Berlin/GDR, by Helmut Loelhoffel, editorial staff member: "Criminality in Communism: An Inconsistency Becomes Apparent -- The GDR Press Finds Itself Compelled To Report on Rise in Crimes." A translation of the Erfurt DAS VOLK item in the question-and-answer feature discussed below follows this commentary. In addition, a translation of the East Berlin NEUE JUSTIZ article referred to below appears in JPRS 74059, 22 Aug 79, No 1709 of this series, pp 15-24]

[Text] "...And Then My Purse Was Gone" -- "Telephone Directory Predators Foiled" -- "Not the Season for Pickpockets" -- "Unscrupulous Housing Black-Marketeers Convicted." With these and other headings the GDR press has of late been reporting daily and extensively on a phenomenon that has consciously been withheld from the public for years: criminality in the "first worker and peasant state on German soil." The public is reading the unusually sensational headlines with astonishment and asking about the possible reasons for the change of heart by the party editors who earlier made certain that the people were enlightened with only small doses of such discomfiting information.

Juenter Thiel, department chief with the Erfurt GDR Railroad Division, has also been wondering about the sudden and regular appearance of such a volume of police and court reports. "Are our courts now resorting to drastic measures?" -- this was the question he asked of DAS VOLK, the Erfurt SED newspaper. He received a reply from the highest authority. Peter Przybylski, public prosecutor with the Office of the GDR Prosecutor General and moderator of the popular television series "The Public Prosecutor's Forum," reassured the concerned railroad man: "I can say here that the development of criminality in the GDR has in principle followed a favorable course... . We have neither professional criminals nor armed gangsters, neither a narcotics trade nor white slavery."

In fact, if the published and in part not directly comparable figures are correct, the number of crimes in the GDR is substantially lower than in the

FRG, to say nothing of West Berlin. According to the GDR Statistical Annual, last year there were 693 crimes for every 100,000 inhabitants; the absolute figure for 1978 was given as 116,170 (1977: approximately 116,000; 1976: 124,678). What concerns public prosecutors and judges, police and politicians, is not the comparatively low rate of criminality, but the rising number of property crimes, the increase in juvenile delinquency and the high rate of recidivism.

According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the penchant for crime is not inherent in man but arises as the result of societal influences; under communism, crime will be totally eradicated. Consequently, a declining crime curve would constitute proof of social progress. In order to deceive the public in this regard, the GDR has hitherto avoided any kind of reporting on crime, and not only in its press; it even believed it could get by without releasing official crime statistics between 1971 and 1977. Following this hiatus, publication of these statistics was resumed for the first time in 1978. In the spring of this year, the press also began reporting once again on petty swindles and major fraud, on brawls and murders. To be sure, these reports take pains to depict at least serious crime as foreign to the nature of the socialist system.

But an internal contradiction threatened to become public when the GDR judicial system set about preparing the new changes in criminal law that have been in effect since 1 August of this year. Since it had become necessary to introduce threats of more severe punishment and new statements of facts, the citizens would have been correct in asking: Then why are all kinds of crimes and misdemeanors systematically hushed up? So the SED people in the Central Committee who were responsible for agitation and propaganda decided to abandon their former reserve and permit more than a scattering of isolated reports. Public Prosecutor Przybylski offers the following justification for the cautious relaxation: "If we have of late been reporting frequently -- or rather, more regularly -- on crimes against socialist property, this is because it seems necessary to us to devote even greater attention to this problem, to sharpen the public's eye for such violations of the law and to shake up the people, if you will, arouse their willingness to bear their share of responsibility for maintaining observance of the law. We believe that the public's need-to-know requires us to report on such crimes. And as a rule we shall also be providing information on the outcome of trials, or the responsibility of the penal system."

This is now being done, even though coverage is still spotty. The purpose is a deterrent effect: The citizens of the GDR are supposed to see that criminals are being pursued relentlessly, that the judicial system is enforcing the laws and that there are severe punishments. This switch even shows a willingness to chance a loss of prestige: first, because everything is not all right in the GDR state; second, because the real situation has been kept hidden until now.

Preparations had been made a long time ago for the new course. In early April of this year the East Berlin technical journal NEUE JUSTIZ came out with a criticism of the public prosecutor's office, saying that it was not being consistent in exerting its "control over observance of the law." The journal said it was necessary to be more energetic about remedying "certain conditions that encourage crimes against socialist property and the economy." Accordingly, it happens too often that losses and damage in the enterprises are not reported to higher authorities and those responsible go unpunished.

It does indeed occur everywhere in the GDR, particularly in the economic sector, that a blind eye is turned to petty inefficiencies and graft. It frequently happens that the chronic supply deficiency in certain objects like building materials and spare automobile parts are the cause of minor bribes or major manipulations. It is also true that the long waiting periods for new cars (presently at least 8 years for a Trabant and about 11 years for a Wartburg) lead many people into wrongdoing or to participate in the thriving black market in automobiles at excessive prices, where motor vehicle profiteers make enormous profits. Also on the increase of late have been stories about black-marketing in housing and illegal meat sales. A 30-year-old sales manager was caught recently in East Berlin doing a crooked business with fictitious empty bottles. Together with two companions he took in 5,000 marks in a period of 3 months. The heading in the court report of the BERLINER ZEITUNG -- "Full Pockets from Empty Bottles" -- could also have come from one of West Berlin's large dailies.

Thus it appears that the editors are also not underestimating the entertainment value of such news. But in most cases the often meager crime reports read like this one by the German General News Service (ADN): "Search brought to successful conclusion. Roland Hoerig, being sought on suspicion of murdering a young woman, was seized on 10 July 1979. He was arrested by an aide to the German People's Police who had received a tip from the manager of a snack bar in Koenigstein, Pirna Kreis. Roland Hoerig is also strongly suspected of having carried out a series of burglaries in summer cottages and bungalows in various GDR bezirks, in the course of which he stole money as well as food and luxury food items. The German People's Police thank all citizens who contributed to the capture of the dangerous criminal." All the same, a year ago an announcement like that about real criminality existing in the GDR would have been inconceivable.

Necessity for Reportage

Erfurt DAS VOLK in German 8 Aug 79 p 3

[Answer by Dr Peter Przybylski, public prosecutor, Office of the GDR Prosecutor General, to question in "Readers' Forum" column posed by Guenter Thiel, department chief, Erfurt Reichsbahnamt (GDR railroad division): "Are Our Courts Resorting to More Drastic Measures Now?" In this context, it is interesting to note that the "Readers' Forum" feature in the Leipzig LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG, 24 Aug 79, p 8, carries the identical text of Przybylski's

answer in response to the identically worded question by "Gunther Thiel, 706 Leipzig." In both newspapers the writer prefaced his question with the observation that, lately, press coverage of court proceedings has been on the increase/

[Text] We have frequently been asked similar questions most recently. There was a slight undertone of concern over the possibility that crime had increased here, so that it "had become necessary" for us to do more reporting on crime, particularly against socialist property.

I can say here that the development of criminality in the GDR has in principle followed a favorable course. Its present level is only about 25 percent of the crime that was recorded in the year our republic was founded. Perhaps the following comparison will also make this clear: Last year 5,514 crimes were registered per inhabitant in the FRG; in West Berlin that figure was as high as 10,739. The comparable figure for the GDR was 756. In contrast to the other figures mentioned, this one also includes traffic offenses! We have neither professional criminals nor armed gangsters, neither a narcotics trade nor white slavery. This is well known.

If we have of late been reporting frequently -- or rather, more regularly -- on crimes against socialist property, but personal property as well, this is because it seems necessary to us to devote even greater attention to this problem, to sharpen the public's eye for such violations and to shake up the people, if you will, arouse their willingness to bear their share of responsibility for maintaining observance of the law.

We believe that the public's need-to-know requires us to report on such crimes. And as a rule we shall also be providing information on the outcome of trials, or the responsibility of the penal system. We shall be continuing this information policy since many citizens welcome it.

Thus, our courts are not taking more drastic action, as was asked here. It is still true that some 60 percent of all criminals in our country do not receive prison sentences; in other words, they are not isolated from society. Rather, they are educated and re-educated by social forces. But this means that society -- once it is in a position to establish such humane conditions for the lawbreaker -- must take advantage of every opportunity for control, for accountability to society on the part of the lawbreaker. An example of our particular concern in this regard is the third amending law to the Criminal Code, the text of which was published on 2 July 1979 in the GESETZBLATT DER DDR. And our information policy is making a similar contribution.

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VIEWS ON RAIDING OPERATIONS CONFLICT

Large-Scale Operations

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH in Polish No 12, Dec 78 pp 53-59

[Article by Col Dr Teofil Wojcik]

[Text] In recent years....

In recent years, interest in raiding operations has increased. In history they are known under the name of incursion operations. In current literature, views on conducting them are highly controversial, frequently even contradictory. They are assigned to those tasks realized by detached units. In several publications the authors believe that it is essential to form special raiding units for this type of operation.

After considering the problem of raiding operations in several tactical-operational and tactical maneuvers, it is now possible to define the main principles of organizing and conducting them. Nonetheless, however, many problems still require investigation and solution. Several of them are discussed in this article.

Conditions for Conducting Raiding Operations

The increasing military capabilities of combat units [regiment, independent battalion, independent company and equivalent units or subunits] and tactical [brigade, division, corps], along with the fluid and dynamic character of conflict, permits the assumption that raiding operations could be conducted by detached units of varied make-ups. This results equally from the need to combat diverse objectives (targets) and the important sources of firepower deep within enemy groupings. Moreover, raiding operations somewhat round out a firepower system and contribute to the attainment of fire superiority. At the same time, they disorganize the firepower, command, and logistics system and hence significantly limit the combat capability of the enemy.

The most favorable conditions for conducting these operations arise during pursuit, which is characterized by the lack of a continuous front, a non-stabilized situation, and an unstable enemy firepower system. This makes

possible the free operation of detached units using raiding techniques in the rear of the enemy's tactical (operations) grouping, as well as the active search for and assault on specified objectives.

In evaluating the conditions of conducting raiding operations, one must take notice of the immense changes that have occurred in relation to the World War II period. There will be no territories slightly or moderately controlled by the enemy since the European theatre of operations is characterized by large urban population centers, industrial centers, and a developed road system. Therefore, enormous difficulties will arise in conducting operations in these areas, especially in a tactical zone with the greatest concentration of troops, weapons, and transportation equipment. For example, in a defense zone the enemy combat unit and tactical formation can utilize as a rule 3-4 roads with paved surface. Thus, as one-third of the enemy forces maneuvers while the greater part of the rear forces are engaged in supply activity, on each roadway many different vehicles can be found. Taking into account the depth of a tactical grouping (tactical formation) in defense, one can find over 10 vehicles in motion per average kilometer of roadway.

From this it follows that a detached unit operating under the raiding method cannot use the main (more important) roads. To avoid encounters with enemy columns, especially at times of penetration into the depths of enemy groupings, it will be necessary to travel via field and forest pathways and often cross-country.

A General Evaluation of Objects Marked For Destruction

Many enemy outposts having influence over the course of the battle are located before the Front of attack (in the operational zones). Among the most important of these are undoubtedly the means of nuclear attack, special ammunition depots, ordnance with great lethality, anti-aircraft weapons, as well as the electronic warfare command system and logistics system.

Among those means of nuclear attack that could be destroyed in raiding operations are tactical and tactical-operational means of nuclear attack, nuclear ammunition, mines, and warheads, and technical service facilities. Among the most important conventional means of firepower which could be destroyed by detached units operating under the raiding method one should include batteries of LARS(MARS)-- highly mobile and having great firepower--as well as artillery subunits, especially those of long range.

Command posts (from battalion level on up), with a developed system of information and communication, play a major role, and determine to a considerable extent the degree of success in battle. Disrupting the command system through raiding operations would deprive the enemy of the possibility of reacting to the course of battle and coordinating his operations.

The system of radioelectronic warfare contains diverse subunits and means of disrupting the command of our forces. Hence, combatting this also plays a vital role for it leads directly to attaining and exploiting superiority over an opponent, both in the realm of command and the fire control system.

The logistics system is particularly vulnerable to detached units activities. Combatting its components leads to a disruption of the delivery and provisioning of ammunition and materiel to the troops, thereby diminishing their combat value.

Raiding operations will also play an important role in combatting the anti-aircraft system of the enemy. It consists predominately of small targets dispersed over a small area, normally difficult to uncover and destroy with other weapons. Thus their destruction by detached units will also be justified.

Characteristics Of Raiding Operations

Properly prepared detached units will conduct raiding operations, which will boldly and decisively penetrate deep into enemy formations and the Formations' rear areas carrying out surprise attacks against designated objectives, destroying them or disrupting enemy operations capabilities, breaking off the attack, withdrawing secretly, striking against the next objective (direction, region) and, in the final phase, either returning (passing through the enemy formations) or remaining in his rear areas until the time when forces advancing from the front shall have arrived.

Their goal is to carry combat operations inside and in the rear areas of the enemy formation, while destroying important objectives which could not be destroyed by other means. Moreover, raiding operations must have a precisely defined objective and missions, along with a method and time frame for their completion. Even though raiding operations have attributes of tactical operations, sometimes their planning, especially air protection and support, occurs at the operational level.

The conditions under which a detached unit might enter into a raiding operation will be unusually diverse. In each instance its departure should be very thoroughly prepared. These units may cross the Forward Edge of the Battle Area [FEBA] (rubież styczności wojsk):

- on the attack, after breaking through the main enemy defense position (when there is an opportunity for maneuvering to flank his formation, as well as for opening up a gap in the defense at least to the depth of the primary defense force units);
- in a meeting engagement and pursuit (when there are open flanks and gaps);
- through not easily accessible gaps and sections of terrain in the enemy defenses;
- in directions of nuclear attacks;
- by air (helicopter airlift).

The basic forms of combatting objectives and elements in the midst of an enemy tactical (operational) grouping are assaults, ambushes, and attacks from concealment. A detached unit can strike with all or a part of its forces, independently or in conjunction with airborne assaults.

The operational methods of detached units will depend on the type of operations conducted, combat missions, terrain conditions, and the tactical-operational situation, as well as the nature of the enemy's operations. Taking these factors into account, one can somewhat distinguish three main methods of raiding operations, namely:

--departure and breakthrough into the rear area of the enemy tactical (operational) formation, attacking and destroying its objectives in the direction of our own forces (as a rule, parallel to the front), and once again crossing the lines of the engaged forces. This method can be applied both offensively and defensively;

--departure and breakthrough into the enemy rear area, with the simultaneous movement into the midst of the tactical (operational) grouping and the destruction of objectives in a designated area (direction). In the final phase the detached unit may receive the task of holding the designated objective itself or in concert with air assault troops and holding it until the arrival of the main forces of our troops.

--departure toward a defined region (area) in the enemy rear and fighting designated objectives until the arrival of the main forces of the tactical formation. Time required for conducting this operation could run from several hours to several days.

Real opportunities for conducting land-air raiding operations exist under present conditions. Thus, a detached unit might consist of forces and weapons operating on land (the ground echelon) as well as forces and weapons striking from the air (attack helicopters and helicopter assault groups).

The following are among the principal missions which might be carried out by a detached unit operating using raiding method:

--search and destroy of the means of nuclear attack, along with stockpiles of special ammunition and ammunition preparation points (areas);

--reconnoitering and destruction of subunits of rocket (barrel) artillery both in movement and at their launch (firing) positions, including anti-aircraft weapons;

--uncovering and destroying command posts, communications centers, and radar stations and at the same time the disrupting of command and reconnaissance systems;

destruction of varied types of rear area structures and equipment, both in motion and stationary (disrupting the logistics system);

- uncovering, isolating, and smashing special reserves;
- destruction of helicopters and airplanes on landing strips and airfields;
- causing chaos and panic in the rear area by destroying transportation-related objectives, pipelines, bridges, dams, etc.

A detached unit earmarked for raiding operations could also capture and hold --until the arrival of main forces or the debarkation of assault troops--important objectives, vantage points, or key crossings in not easily accessible terrain.

Composition, Formation And Combat Possibilities

With regard to the character, tasking, strength, and methods of protecting (defending) the objectives designated as objectives of raiding operations forces from the platoon to the unit level are indispensable (see table).

A detached unit can be organized prior to or at the time of a battle, with a composition ranging from a reinforced tank company (BMP-mounted infantry company) to a reinforced battalion, and sometimes a regiment. The composition of the detached unit should include anti-aircraft weapons and artillery, sapper and other subunits. Operations of a detached unit might be supported with attack aircraft and attack helicopters. A detached unit assigned to conduct raiding operations could be organized at the unit level on up. A tactical formation might be composed of a detached unit of from battalion to regiment strength reinforced with branch and service weapons and subunits.

In order to assure its self-sufficiency, the detached unit operating under the raiding method should have at its disposal appropriate forces and materiel, including medicines and maintenance equipment. The quantity of supporting forces and material must not limit the detached units' freedom and mobility. I think that it would be necessary to take into account the following basic items:

- mobile technical workshops (armored prime movers)--one per tank or BMP-mounted mechanized infantry company;
- medical--one armored medical transport per tank or BMP-mounted mechanized infantry company;
- double the normal amount of ammunition and fuels and lubricants (in quantities necessary for mission execution.)

One must assume that the detached unit will capture part of its materiel supplies, chiefly fuel and foodstuffs.

The great firepower, maneuvering and transport capabilities of the BMP's and tanks place real demands on the support and reinforcement subunits going into the make-up of detached units tasked with raiding operations.

With regards to artillery subunits, this means that they should have great potential for maneuverability, great firepower and range, and they should be prepared to operate under difficult terrain conditions. That is why self-propelled artillery above all should be included in the composition of the detached unit. Artillery support of a detached unit can be either direct--by artillery subunits comprising the detached unit--or indirect, through Regimental Artillery Groups or Divisional Artillery Groups. Artillery subunits can form a fire support group, carrying out fire missions independently, e.g., destroying (disabling) a specified objective as well as supporting the main force of the detached unit.

The number of anti-aircraft weapons depends upon: the makeup of the detached unit, the nature of the objectives earmarked for destruction, the time span of the raiding operation, and the tactical-operational situation. During an operation, the greatest air threat would occur along sectors of the march to the objective as well as during the forming of columns and withdrawal of the unit after the mission was completed. To combat this, the enemy as a rule uses armed helicopters and sometimes fighter-bomber aircraft. On these occasions, anti-aircraft cover should be especially heavy and resistant to enemy helicopter attack.

Depending upon the composition of the unit, it might have to be reinforced with an anti-aircraft platoon or battery of the ZSU-23-4 type and specialized anti-aircraft defense weapons, chiefly anti-aircraft guns, might be used to destroy particular elements of an attack objective, for example, planes and helicopters on landing strips, radar stations and communications centers, warehouses, and fuel dumps etc.

Assuring a detached unit freedom of action and the capability of destroying fixed (permanent) objectives in the enemy rear requires the attachment to it of the following engineering forces and means: squads of sappers (up to company strength), portable bridges, tanks with bangalore torpedoes and a bulldozer device, mines and explosives and other weapons and engineering equipment.

The battle array of the detachment depends upon its composition, the nature of enemy objectives targeted for destruction, terrain conditions, and the tactical-operational situation. However, the principal influence will be exerted by its composition, the nature of its and the terrain conditions.

The following elements could comprise the makeup of a detachment's formation:

- reconnaissance patrols (patrol vehicles);
- fire-support groups (artillery for indirect and direct fire and anti-aircraft forces and weapons);
- main forces (first echelon);
- reserves (support echelon);

--security forces and weapons;

--forces and means for material-technical and medical support.

The principal element and main striking force of the detached unit are the main force and the "air echelon".¹ At least two-thirds of the forces and weapons of the unit should comprise the main force. Subunits of self-propelled artillery for indirect and direct fire, together with anti-aircraft defense forces and weapons, comprise the fire-support group. The reserve (support echelon) is vital for the accomplishment of many, frequently unforeseen missions. Hence, its role is exceptionally great.

From an appraisal of individual elements of the battle array of a detached unit, it follows that each of them--irrespective of assignment--should be capable of self-defense in the event of enemy attack. They must therefore form a cohesive unit (subunit) capable of swift and unexpected attacks on enemy objectives. Here, the principle of "move separately--attack together" prevails.

The combat capabilities of a detached unit conducting raiding operations depends chiefly on its composition. They can be increased significantly when gaining the element surprise. Thus, when setting combat tasks for the detached unit, one must look at its capabilities in different lights.

The combat capabilities of attack helicopters supporting the unit's operation or serving as part of that unit will be determined by three sets of factors: combat effectiveness, space, and time. But the main factor is firepower capabilities.²

Organizing Raiding Operations

When organizing an assault, the staff of the unit (tactical formation) may already have at its disposal the necessary data about the enemy's order of battle and objectives, the destruction (incapacitation) of which will fundamentally influence mission performance. Therefore, when planning offensive (defensive) operations, the commander should define in his plan (decision) the means of organizing and sending the detached units to the enemy rear. The formation of a detached unit can occur at the time of planning combat operations (in this way making it possible to assemble the optimal composition and the proper provisioning and support of its operation) and on the spot (it doesn't require much time or too many steps). Raiding operations can be included on standard operational documents (a decision-map, operational chart) or on a separate map.

¹Only when the detached unit is reinforced (supported) by attack helicopters.

²The factors of the combat effectiveness of helicopters depend primarily on their type and weapons system.

From experience, it follows that in planning a raiding operation one must take under consideration; the direction of the operation; the objectives and the sequence of their destruction; composition; the methods of crossing the forward and artillery support areas; organizing joint action with the detached unit's main forces or with an airborne assault; the method of replenishing material resources; the direction of return and link-up with our forces, and other matters. The specifics of the combat missions, and the conditions under which they will be accomplished, demand the proper preparation of the detached units. This is based chiefly on training and the coordination of the individual subunits, on supplying them with essential material means, ammunition, and equipment, on the performance of maintenance checks of combat equipment, as well as on the allocation of forces and means for medical and technical support services.

Those problems singled out do not exhaust the problems of preparing a unit for raiding operations. The individual preparation of the soldiers for operations in the enemy rear is exceptionally important. Since they must exhibit the proper moral and psycho-physical qualities.

As usual, the commander who forms and sends out the detached units also organizes the cooperation between the detached units and the main force or the helicopter assault. Cooperation, however, within the detached unit should be organized by its commander.

In organizing the cooperation, it is vital to consider all possible variants of the enemy action at the moment of realizing specific tasks. Special attention should be focused on the establishment of uniform signals for mutual recognition and for the designation of objectives. Prior to the accomplishment of follow-up missions, the unit commander should, each time,--as needed--spell out precisely the cooperation and discuss the method of realizing the sub-tasks.

An important element of combat support is also the security of the detached unit; it should always be organized independently of the nature of the missions being carried out. The detached unit takes care of all matters of combat support within its own sphere. Therefore, it should have proper forces and means at its disposal.

Crucial Problems In Conducting Raiding Operations

In the course of an attack by a tactical formation, detached units could operate and destroy objectives along a certain direction or in a specified area, as a rule penetrating to the rear of an enemy tactical grouping. These operations consist of a series of surprise raids and ambushes, as well as swift relocations and brief pauses in regions suited for concealment while preparing a renewed attack on another objective. Under favorable conditions (e.g., in pursuit) it might be advisable to attach attack helicopters directly to the unit and then conduct ground-air raid.

The time period for conducting (the duration) raiding operations will most frequently be limited by supplies of fuel and ammunition. If the need arises for conducting a long-lasting raid, the unit must be supplied with fuel and ammunition. In principle, this is possible only by air or by capturing these items in the enemy rear.

The use of raiding operations in defense is less profitable than in offensive operations. Sometimes, however, especially when shifting from the attack to defense and the organization of a defense, this type of operation can yield great results. Their goal during the organization of a defense will be to disrupt the command system of those enemy armies engaged (from the lowest levels on up) by destroying command posts, observation points, artillery emplacements, delivery systems for nuclear weapons and by disorganizing the reconnaissance system.

At the moment of shifting from the attack to defense, the possibility exists of detaching portions of one's forces (company-battalion) from the main force of the unit or tactical formation. In this instance, their skillful use for operations as a raiding unit permits the destruction of specified objectives and the disorganization of the enemy attack in a swift and organized fashion, and at the same time produces conditions favorable for the unit's main force's tactical formation's shift to the defense. This is undoubtedly a difficult and responsible task, demanding the proper composition and preparation of the detached unit.

In the course of conducting a defense action, it would seem proper to use the detached units for fighting the enemy columns that are being brought up from the rear, especially those from the deployment area moving in battalion-strength columns. This requires close cooperation with the artillery, so that immediately after its fire (bursts) has ceased an attack of the detached unit would follow.

A successive mission of these units could be shadowing the movement of command posts and nuclear weapon delivery systems, and then attacking them at the proper moment, chiefly during their movement and deployment. Such operations should be pre-planned and carefully synchronized with regard to time and place, to avoid being hit by our own rocket fire.

Great advantages can accrue from the use of a detached unit to destroy those elements of an enemy tactical grouping which, in terms of their small size and great mobility, would be either difficult to destroy with artillery fire, or would require a huge quantity of ammunition for their destruction. Among these should be included anti-aircraft and LARS rocket artillery batteries. Close cooperation with reconnaissance organs is also indispensable during these operations.

When utilizing raiding operations in defense, it is vital to foresee problems connected with supplying the detached unit with weapons and the means of returning (penetrating), as well as of joining up with the main forces on the defensive.

There is no doubt that some of the combat tasks, particularly in the rear areas of an enemy grouping, should be accomplished by a specialized element of a ground forces grouping--the detached unit. As regards this question, there are two basic positions pertaining to the onomatology of these uncommon activities and the forces assigned to conduct them, namely:

--a detached unit operating under the raiding method;

--a raiding unit understood as an ad hoc element of a tactical grouping assigned to conduct raiding operations.

Among the most important enemy objectives and grouping elements which should be destroyed in the first order are the means for a nuclear attack, special ammunition depots, command posts, special mining subunits, rocket-artillery weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, communications centers, rear area support subunits, technical services, and aircraft and helicopters on air strips. Detached units successfully operating under the raiding method will contribute successfully to the disruption of the command, logistical, and reconnaissance systems, as well as to the limitation of the capabilities for maneuvering by the enemy. Simultaneously, they paralyze the capabilities of a quick enemy reaction to the course of battle and also render his troops more vulnerable to artillery and rocket attack.

SIŁY I ŚRODKI WYDZIELONE DO OCHRONY I OBRONY NIETÓRZYCH OBIEKTÓW NIEPRZYJACIELA ORAZ MOŻLIWY SKŁAD ODDZIAŁU WYDZIELONEGO
DZIAŁAJĄCEGO METODĄ RAJDOWA

Nazwa obiektu 1	2 Liczba ludzi (w porównaniu na planach przemieszczo- nia do ochrony)	Średnia ogólna 3	Niezbędny skład oddziału wydzielonego 4	Wskazanie 5
SD zwłoka taktycznego 6	3 i więcej	12 pancerników i broni maszynowa 7	dwie kompanie, w tym kp na bwp i b 8	bateria haubic samobieżnych, plut. OPL, plucp 9
Bateria wyrzutni HJ (Lance) 10	3-6	4 wyrzutnie rakietowe, 12-18 pancerników i broni maszynowa 11	bca (kp na bwp) 12	plp na bwp*, bateria haubic samobieżnych, pl OPL, drasp 13
Bateria wyrzutni 110 mm LAR3 14	3	8 wyrzutni rakietowych, broni maszynowa 15	bca 16	plp na bwp*, pl OPL, drasp 17
Dyskuzja haubic 155 mm 18	18	18 dział 155 mm, 10 km i 18 pancerników 19	kp na bwp i gusną marmozakazania bca 20	bca haubic samobież. pl OPL, plucp 21
Dyskuzja artylerii przeciwlotniczej 22	26	36 armat 40 mm, 45 pocisków „Belley”, broni maszynowa 23	1 km 24	1 km 24
Batalion rozpoznania (tyły oddziału, ZT) 25	18	73 pancerników, 3 km 26	bca (bca bca) 27	kp na bwp, pl OPL, plucp 28
Skwadra radiolokacyjna 29	50 dyskusja	broni maszynowa 31	plp na bwp 32	drasp, plut. nadebr. 33
Bateria haubic 203,2 mm 34	3-4	6 haubic 203,2 mm, 10 pancerników 35	bca 16	plp na bwp, pl OPL, drasp 17

36. W przypadku, gdy w skład oddziału wydzielonego wchodzi tylko pododdział czołgów.

FORCES AND WEAPONS ASSIGNED TO PROTECT AND DEFEND SOME ENEMY OBJECTIVES, AND POSSIBLE MAKEUP OF A DETACHED UNIT OPERATING UNDER THE RAIDING METHOD

Key:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Name of objective | 18. 155 mm Howitzer Battalion |
| 2. Number of people (computed for platoons assigned for defense) | 19. 18 155 mm guns, 10 machine guns, and 18 anti-tank rocket launchers |
| 3. Firepower | 20. BMP-mounted infantry battalion with air-control team |
| 4. Essential makeup of the detached unit | 21. Self-propelled howitzer battery, anti-aircraft platoon, sapper platoon |
| 5. Reinforcement | 22. Anti-aircraft artillery battalion |
| 6. Tactical formation command post | 23. 36 40mm cannon, 45 Redeye missiles, automatic weapons |
| 7. 12 anti-tank rocket launchers and automatic weapons | 24. As above |
| 8. 2 companies including BMP-mounted mechanized infantry company and a tank company | 25. Supply battalion (rear of the unit or tactical formation) |
| 9. Self-propelled howitzer battery, anti-aircraft platoon, sapper platoon | 26. 73 anti-tank rocket launchers, 5 machine guns |
| 10. Battery of Honest John (Lance) launchers | 27. Tank battalion (minus a tank com.) |
| 11. 4 rocket launchers, 12-18 anti-tank rocket launchers, automatic weapons | 28. BMP-mounted infantry company, anti-aircraft platoon, sapper platoon |
| 12. Tank company (BMP-mounted infantry company) | 29. Radar station |
| 13. BMP-mounted infantry platoon, self-propelled howitzer battery, sapper squad | 30. Squad |
| 14. LARS 110mm Artillery Rocket Launcher system | 31. Automatic weapons |
| 15. 8 rocket launchers, automatic weapons | 32. BMP-mounted infantry platoon |
| 16. Tank company | 33. Sapper squad, mortar platoon |
| 17. BMP-mounted infantry platoon, anti-aircraft platoon, sapper squad | 34. 203.2mm howitzer battery |
| | 35. 6 203.2mm howitzer batteries, 10 anti-tank rocket launchers |
| | 36. When only tank subunits are in the detached unit's makeup |

Rebuttal, Small-Scale Alternative

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH in Polish No 7, Jul 79 pp 51-52

[Article by Col Grzegorz Przychodzki]

[Text] The increased interest in the problem of raiding....

The increased interest in the problem of raiding operations has caused the publication of articles in the military press, in which attempts are made

to define the methods of organizing and operating those units carrying out the raiding tasks.

In attempts to classify these operations, in discussions and considerations, there has surfaced a tendency to cite and seek a point of reference in historical advanced detachment operations (proposals for organizing large units dispatched at great distances), as well as to citing the definition found in the Little Military Encyclopedia.¹ It would thus follow, that many of the principles pertaining to advanced detachment operations of that era are still functional today. I do not intend to question the correct--almost classic--definition of advanced detachment operations (raiding) conducted in the 16-19th centuries. Indeed, with minor changes one could so characterize modern raiding operations with regard to their very great degree of generalization. However, it is an obvious misunderstanding to equate advanced detachment operations with modern raiding operations.

Conditions were different then. The tendency to settle a war in principle during one battle made it necessary to concentrate an entire army in one place. In that way vast reaches of the country were left defenseless or at best some cities were garrisoned with weak detachments. That permitted the raiding parties great freedom of action over significant operational areas, and created the opportunity for conducting a march over the course of more than a month without any contact with the enemy in the initial phase of the raid. Thus, the operational principles then prevailing resulted from existing conditions, i.e., large raiding detachments operating over very great distances, self-sufficient over a long period,² and executing numerous missions.

So much for history--what about the present? Much has changed since the times of Stefan Batory or Jan Sobieski! Setting aside the matter of the armament, technical equipping and operational principles of armies, first and foremost the conditions of conducting operations in general have changed. It would be difficult to imagine a situation--in a tactical zone of enemy defense or in the operational interior--wherein conditions would arise for conducting raiding operations with large units separated from their main forces for several weeks or longer. This raises the question of whether one can speak of the existence of conditions conducive to the conduct of raiding operations at all? Naturally, the answer is yes--but, for the reasons which I have just cited, with relatively small units at shallow penetration depth and for a rather short period of time. Perhaps the conditions of the current battlefield can permit only such a solution.

¹ "An expedition of an independent group moving and operating separately from the main forces in the heart of enemy territory or on enemy-occupied territory." MEW, 3, p. 589.

² The Radziwill Raid--initially with 4,000 horses, but ending with 6,600--operated apart from the main forces for 78 days (Aug. 15-Oct. 10, 1581). MEW, 3, p. 27.

There has been discussion on the possibilities for detached unit operations under the raiding method.³ But what is the difference in the operation of a detached unit according to the classical concept, and that using the raiding method? The patchwork method--a little from the detached unit, a bit from the raiding party, a little from reconnaissance operations--does not lead to anything. In this fashion, "something" is established, which is supposed to: "boldly and decisively penetrate into the interior... furtively attack objectives... break off from attacks." And this is a unit numbering about 90 vehicles of various types.⁴ The contradictions contained in these expressions are so obvious that it is not necessary to convince anyone. It is impossible for modern operations to carry out a furtive attack with such a unit, particularly if we act "boldly and decisively." One should also not forget that by the concept of "penetration" we understand the concealed passage through gaps in the enemy formation,⁵ which is in open contradiction with the viewpoint presented in the article of Col. Wojcik. A unit with the makeup as presented therein has almost no chance--within the entire tactical zone of the enemy defense--for a concealed passage to the objective of attack and avoidance of premature contact with the enemy.

Let us try to define the operation of a raiding unit. For this is an operation of a agile unit possessing significant combat strength, the capacity for rapid movement along difficult and pathless terrain, for the independent accomplishment of combat missions based upon the disruption of command and the destruction of objectives and elements of a tactical grouping. These missions might be: destroying or depriving the combat capability of command posts, rocket launch sites, artillery emplacements, communication centers, or supply points, disrupting the supply system, destroying columns, etc.

Could they be accomplished only by large units, or by a powerful detached unit?

In many regards, units⁶ with smaller makeups would seem to be the most suitable for this type of operation, e.g.:

--a BMP-mounted infantry company reinforced with two tank platoons, a sapper platoon, and a contamination reconnaissance squad;

--a tank company reinforced with two platoons of BMP-mounted infantry, a sapper platoon, and a contamination reconnaissance squad.

Since a combat makeup of a raiding unit insures great firepower (20-21 guns, 6-10 anti-tank guided missile launchers, 40-42 machine guns), along with flexibility and maneuverability. There is no justifiable need for reinforcing

³ Col. Wojcik, "Prowadzenie dzialan rajdowych" [Staging Raiding Operations], PWL, 12/78

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54

⁵ MEW, 2, p. 897

⁶ "Unit" is used here as an element of a tactical grouping

it with artillery for indirect fire, since it will accomplish its tasks generally in direct fighting with direct firing. As I see it, the most typical operating methods should be seen as attacks upon objectives and ambushes. But the accomplishment of these missions should not be connected with the undertaking of a long-lasting battle; one attack should settle it.

After a concealed (to the extent possible) advance to the designated objective, an unexpected and heavy fire assault along with a "charge of tanks and transporters" should assure the accomplishment of each task falling within the realm of raiding operations.

I believe that a raiding unit could receive several, say, 2-3 such tasks, but only within one operational time period. We should not exclude the possibility that these operations might last longer under favorable conditions. It would also seem worthwhile to send 2-3 units with a similar makeup, carrying out missions independently of each other, so that in the end their effort can be concentrated upon achieving a joint, successive and more complex mission.

It is accepted that a unit carrying out a raiding mission could be strengthened by helicopters. The possibility is thus created of operating in the air and on land.

For many obvious reasons, it would seem more logical to use helicopters as a means of fire support, transporting supplies, and evacuation rather than as reinforcements.⁷

Finally, the matter of choosing the proper terminology: "Operations of a detached unit using the raiding method," "Raid of a detached unit," or "Raiding unit?" I am inclined toward "raiding unit," because the makeup, missions, and means of achieving them differ from operations of a detached unit in the hitherto-accepted sense. A detached unit--in the classical conception--should be understood as a unit designed to carry out missions requiring great combat strength, the efforts of various branch subunits as well as the capacity to conduct an independent battle over a longer period, which consists chiefly of holding a secured area or objectives having great (sometimes decisive) bearing on the accomplishment of a combat mission. Typical tasks might be: capturing a favorable territorial area, road juncture, bridgehead on a river, an isthmus between lakes, mountain pass, etc. In all cases, these areas or objectives should be held until the arrival of main forces. The detached unit must accomplish one, and only one, mission, and the entirety of its operation should be subordinated to its accomplishment.

I have presented a bare outline of my views on the conduct of raiding operations.

The differences in these matters derive from theoretical considerations, which must be confronted and verified during experimental exercises.

⁷ See Brig. Gen. Kowalewicz, "Frontal support for raiding operations," Mys Wojskowa, 1/79, p. 36.

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